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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
-and- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 TWUA

OPINION AND AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Articles 7, 37 and
38 of the contract when it did not pay
Raymond
Ortiz, Jr. for April 19, 1990? If
so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on July 30, 1991 at which time, Mr.
Ortiz, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All con-

cerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The grievant is a MIU driver, servicing parochial schools.
Relevant to his regular work schedule is the Calendar of the
Board of Education for 1989-1990.

Where that Calendar shows a

"Recess" or "Schools Closed," the grievant does not work on those
days.

Yet, he is paid his regular wages for that time.

In addi-

tion, he does not work other "recesses" or "school closings"
applicable to the parochial schools he services.

And, as with

Board of Education "closings and recesses," he is paid for that
off time as well.
The instant grievance involves both of the foregoing circumstances.

Under the Board of Education Calendar, the grievant was

-2scheduled off for a "Spring Recess," April 9 through April 17,
1990.

He was paid for that period.

that period off, he was told by

Also, prior to beginning

supervision that he would also

be off April 18, 19 and 20th, due to parochial school closings
on those latter three days and was to report back to work on
April 23rd.

Again, he was to be paid for the latter period as

well.
On April 18th, the Company was notified that an error in
the parochial school schedule had been made, and that ten buses
and ten drivers would be needed for April 19th.
among those who were needed.

The grievant was

The ten affected drivers were called

on the 18th; all, including the grievant were reached, and nine
responded affirmatively to the recall for the 19th.

The grievant

declined to report for work on the 19th, explaining at the arbitration hearing that he had made prior plans to do some work for
his mother on the 19th, and could not or would not change those
plans.
As a result, the Company did not pay the grievant for the
19th« hence the instant grievance.
It is the Company's position that it withheld pay to the
grievant for the 19th in accordance with a Company policy and
practice.

That policy and practice is and has been not to pay if,

during a period that the driver has been scheduled off, that
schedule is changed by operational needs; the driver is reached
and recalled to work, and he declines or fails to do so.
The Union claims violations of the contract sections referred to in the stipulated issue, as well as the claim that the
recall notice the day before, on the 18th, when the grievant had

-3been told and had reason to expect that he'd be off until the
23rd, was unreasonable and unfair.
It seems to me that this case turns on the answer to two
questions.

The first is, in what status was the grievant

during

the paid periods of non-work under the Board of Education and
parochial school schedules?

I cannot agree with the Union's

suggestion that the grievant was "on vacation" during the critical
period involved.

Vacation time and pay under Article 38 of the

contract is fixed by longevity with the Company and is not calculated by or as part of periods of "recesses" or "school
closings."

Vacation entitlement is separate from and in addition

to those periods of "recesses" and "closings."
On the other hand, and it is conceded

by the Company,

Article 38 provides for regular pay for the drivers when they do
not work during Board of Education "recesses" and "closings,"
and undisputedly this pay provision applies as well to parochial
school "recesses" and "closings" for drivers servicing the affecte
parochial schools.
So, the second question is, conceding

the contractual re-

quirement to pay for the non-working time of "recesses" and
"closings," may ttu Company change that scheduled time off when
it learns or is notified, as in this case, that an error was made
and one or more parochial school drivers and buses are needed?
The contract does not expressly provide for or cover this
circumstance.

Therefore, in my judgment a rule of reason , which

is implied in the interpretation and application of all collective
bargaining agreements, should prevail and provide the answers.

-4Absent a contract definition of the status of a driver
under the circumstances of this case and considering

that he

is in pay status though not scheduled to actively work and not
on vacation, a "rule of reason" would put him in the status of
a "standby."

In other words, in the case of the grievant, though

told he was not needed on April 18, 19 or 20th, he was not totally free (as he might have been if on official vacation) to
reject or decline to accept a change in those off days, if required by operational exigencies and if reached when called.
(It is conceded by the Company that if it was unable to reach
him, he would have been paid).
But the Company's right to make the change it did in this
case, in the sbsence of an express contract provision covering
it, and in view of the pay guarantees of Article 38, requires,
again under a rule of reason, a well defined and promulgated
policy and a reasonable

implementation

of that policy.

Though the Company relies on such a policy or practice
it has not adequately proved it.

The policy is not in written

form, was not formally promulgated and not officially
to or disseminated among the employees.

communicated

At the hearing, though

the Company asserted that the policy and practice were longstanding and regularly applied under circumstances comparable
to this case, it could not give a single specific instance of
its application nor identify any employees to whom the policy
or practice had obtained.

-5I conclude therefore that an appropriate and contractually
sound balance between the above expressed rights of the parties
under these circumstances, is to affirm the Company's right to
take the action it did in this case provided that action is
supported by a well defined, well communicated and well documented
policy or practice, and further provided that its implementation
is reasonable.
But in this case, because on the threshold condition the
Company's evidence falls short of persuasiveness, I must find
that the denial of pay to the grievant for April 19th was violative of the express and stipulated pay guarantees for "recesses"
and "closings" under Article 38 of the contract.

It follows

therefore that I need not decide the question of "reasonableness"
in this matter.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
Under the particular circumstances of
this case, the Company shall pay Raymond
Ortiz, Jr. his regular pay for April 19,
1990.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: August 6, 1991
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK BUS SERVICE -andLOCAL 100 T.W.U.A.
X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA

OPINION and AWARD

and

NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

X
The stipulated issues are:
1.

Was Hugh Restal afforded procedural rights
under the grievance provisions of the
contract?

2.

Was there just cause for the discharge of
Hugh Restal? If not, what shall be the
remedy?

Hearings were held on September 17 and September 24, 1991, at
which time Mr. Restal hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
ISSUE NO. 1
It is the Company's position that following the grievant's
dismissal, he, and the Union on his behalf are procedurally limited to
challenging the discharge in arbitration.

It asserts that under its

contractual right to forthwith discharge an employee who refuses "to
submit to a medical test if suspected of being under the influence of
alcohol and/or using marijuana or other control substances...,"the
grievant and the Union are foreclosed from the preliminary steps of the
grievance procedure in such cases.

The Union argues in the alternative.

First, it asserts that

an employee dismissed for that reason may not be removed from the
payroll until he receives a "24 hour" hearing.

And that thereafter, if

the discharge is implemented following the 24-hour hearing, the affected
employee is entitled to a contractual grievance hearing before being
required to resort to arbitration.

Alternatively, at the hearing, the

Union appeared to modify its position to assert that if the 24-hour
hearing is not contractually required, at least following the employee's
dismissal, the employee is entitled to a Step 2 grievance meeting
preliminary to arbitration.
The pertinent contract provisions are the following portions
of Section 33:
Any employee to whom this contract shall be
applicable, may not be discharged or suspended by
the Employer without first having a hearing and only
for cause.

Said hearing can be called and held

within a 24-hour period.

(Hereinafter referred to

as "Step 1")
•

»

•

All employees suspected of being under the influence
of alcohol and/or using marijuana or other
controlled substances shall be required to submit to
appropriate medical tests which shall be
administered at the Employer's expense.

These tests

shall be administered at a recognized hospital.

In

the event the employee refuses to submit to such
medical examination after having been duly requested

to do so, such employee shall be discharged
forthwith.
And the following parts of Section 34:
Any grievance which cannot be adjusted with the head
of the department in which the grievance arose, may
be submitted in writing to the President of the
Employer, within ten (10) regular working days after
the date of the decision at the department head's
level.

The President shall thereupon have his

representatives hear the same, or hear the same
himself, within four (4) days after receipt of the
written submission a hearing shall be held, notice
of which shall be given to the employee involved at
his last known address and to the Union by telegram
filed for sending or letter mailed at least twentyfour (24) hours prior thereto.

(Hereinafter

referred to as "Step 2")
It is axiomatic that a presumption of validity and
effectiveness should be accorded to all provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement.

That presumption is based, obviously, on the

fact that as bilaterally negotiated clauses the parties must have
intended that each clause have a purpose.

Therefore, arbitrators should

make every reasonable and logical effort to reconcile contract clauses
which might appear in conflict, and to interpret them so that one does
not nullify the other.
Here, to adopt the Company's interpretation that procedurally
none of the preliminary grievance steps are available to the grievant or
to the Union in cases of discharges for refusal to take a drug/alcohol

test would be to nullify or abnormally restrict the foregoing cited
provision of Section 34.

Indeed, it should be noted that that portion

of Section 34 applies to "any grievance which cannot be
adjusted..."(emphasis added), without excepting grievances of the
instant type.
Similarly, to adopt the Union's view that a 24-hour hearing is
needed under Section 33 before such a discharge can be implemented,
would nullify that contractual portion of Section 33 which permits the
Company to discharge an employee "forthwith" if he refuses to take a
drug/alcohol test.

In short, it is inconsistent and incongruous for the

Company to have the right to discharge forthwith and still be required
to hold a 24-hour hearing before that discharge can become effective.
Obviously, to me at least, these respective positions are not
supported by the contract.

Rather the relevant contract clauses can be

logically and reasonably reconciled, according each the effectiveness
intended.

That reconciliation makes the Company and Unions' positions

both wrong in part and right in part.
Clearly, that portion of Section 33 which gives the Company
the right to immediately discharge an employee who refuses to take a
drug/alcohol test is an explicit exception to the other part of Section
33 which calls for a 24-hour hearing before a discharge can be
effectuated.

In other words, employees are entitled to a 24-hour

hearing before their discharge is effective in all dismissal cases
except dismissal for refusal to take a drug/alcohol test.

So the Union

is wrong if and when it claims that discharge for refusal to take such a
test is subject to a 24-hour hearing.
However, the Company is wrong when it limits the procedural
processing of a grievance arising from such a discharge, to arbitration

without any preliminary grievance step.
provide.

The contract does not so

Indeed, as the Company does not claim that any such grievance

is not arbitrable, I find no basis for the claim that it is not
grievable within some part of the grievance procedure prior to
arbitration.

Though foreclosed from a 24-hour hearing, a challenge to

the discharge can be instituted at Step 2 of the grievance procedure.
Manifestly, the language of Step 2 which is applicable to "any grievance
which cannot be adjusted..."is fully supportive of this interpretation.
And, obviously, utilization of Step 2 in no way impinges on the
Company's right to remove the affected employee from the premises and
the payroll under the Company's right to discharge forthwith.
As a discharge for refusal to take a blood/urine test fits
within the category of "any grievance," I conclude that a grievance
arising from a forthwith discharge for refusing to take that test may be
initially processed at Step 2 of the grievance procedure, after the
discharge has been effectuated.
As well as the contract, good labor relations supports this
view.

The grievance procedure is designed to afford an effort at

resolution prior to arbitration.

Though a 24-hour hearing is foreclosed

by the Company's right to discharge forthwith, the proprietary of the
implemented discharge is challengeable, not first in arbitration, but
preliminarily at Step 2.

That it may be settled there or better

clarified there is consistent with well-settled labor relations policy
and objective and, in my view, is in the interest of both sides in a
collective bargaining relationship.
In short, the grievant was not entitled to a 24-hour hearing
before his discharge was implemented.

He was entitled, following his

discharge, to a Step 2 grievance hearing, and thereafter if not settled,

to arbitration.

As there is a stipulation that this part of the

decision is in the nature of a declaratory judgement and that the Union
does not seek a specific remedy from any failure of the Company to
accord the grievant procedural rights, no remedy is Awarded despite the
Company's failure to accord him a Step 2 hearing.
ISSUE NO. 2

On the merits, I have consistently and previously held that
the Company must have reasonable grounds or cause to require an employee
to take a medical test for alcohol and/or drugs.

An employee cannot be

required to do so in the absence of some objective suspicion some
symptomatology of drug or alcohol use or drug or alcohol impairment.
Though, arguable, I find that the Company has met that test in
this case.
The grievant acted uncharacteristically.
defiance and was confrontational to supervision.
from his work area.

He exhibited anger,

At first, he was away

When directed to return to work gassing vehicles,

he responded most intemperately, cursing the supervisor and using
obscene and insulting language.

While gassing up a vehicle he angrily

slammed the gas nozzle into the vehicle and its gas tank with unusual
violence.

He paced about and walked from the area in what appeared to

be an uncontrolled and irrational manner.

After being ordered by

supervision to leave his post and to clock out he continued his angry,
loud and profane outburst in the field station.

I accept, as accurate,

the Company's testimony that these acts and this demeanor were grossly
out of character and highly abnormal for the grievant, and hence,
legitimately suspicious.

Under these circumstances, I do not find that

it was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable for supervisor Johnson to

decide to check whether drugs or alcohol were responsible for the
grievant's behavior, by ordering him to take a blood/urine test.

The

evidence is clear that he was ordered to do so several times; that he
ignored and refused to comply; and instead, clocked out.

I am persuaded

that he knew that he had been ordered to take the test and that he knew
he was refusing to comply.
There is, however, a mitigating factor which impels me, in
this particular case and without precedent, to reduce the discharge to a
suspension.

Erroneously, but understandingly, I find that the grievant

thought he was not required to comply with the order to take the test
because, earlier, he had been expressly told that he had been relieved
of his duties and expressly told to clock out.

I conclude that he

thought that at that point the Company no longer had disciplinary
jurisdiction over him for the additional purpose of requiring a
blood/urine test.

He was wrong of course, because he was still on

Company property; still within the employment relationship; and still
acting improperly.

But I believe that he honestly thought otherwise.

So I shall give him the benefit of what I think was his sincere, but
erroneous belief.
It should be clear that a reduction in the penalty of
discharge to a suspension is limited to this case alone.

It should

serve as notice to all employees that if the Company has grounds to
require a blood/urine test it may order it, and the employee must comply
even if he is first relieved of his job duties and even if first told to
clock out.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above-named parties and being duly

heard the proof and allegations of such parties makes the following
AWARD:
1.

Hugh Restal was not afforded his full
procedural rights under the grievance
provisions of the contract.

He should

have been accorded a Step 2 hearing before
being required to submit his grievance to
arbitration.

By stipulation of the

parties, no remedy is Awarded.
2.

The discharge of Hugh Restal is reduced to
a suspension.

He shall be reinstated

without back pay.

The period of time

between his discharge and his
reinstatement shall be deemed a
disciplinary suspension.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

December 27, 1991

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.
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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
of AMERICA -and- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100, Transport Workers
Union of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the contract by not
giving the grievant, Maurice Champeer, a
fourth day of bereavement? If so what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held on February 9, 1990 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared, as did
the grievant. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The pertinent contract provision reads:
After 60 calendar days of service, the Employer shall provide a full paid leave of four (4)
days for death in immediate family. For the
purpose of this section, the immediate family
shall be defined to mean the spouse, children,
parents, brother, sister, mother-in-law and
father-in-law of the employee. The death certificate will be provided to the Employer by
the Committee. It is understood that paid leave
for death in family shall be be paid to any employee while on sick leave, leave of absence,
vacation, Worker's Compensation status, regular
days off, or on any other inactive status.
What is in dispute is whether the four days paid leave is
a fixed amount regardless of the period of time between the death
and burial or disposition

of the remains of the deceased, or

-2-

whether it is a maximum only if the period between death and burial is equal to or exceeds four days; but reduced to a lesser number of paid leave days if that period is shorter.
In the instant case the grievant received three days paid
leave because that was the period of his scheduled work time from
death to burial.

The death involved occurred on a Friday.

The

grievant had scheduled days off on Saturday and Sunday. The burial was on the following Tuesday. The grievant was given paid leav
for Friday, Monday and Tuesday.
The parties do not disagree that the bereavement leave begins with the death, and continues for consecutive days, excluding, as in this case "regular days off." They disagree on when
the leave ends. The Union asserts that it must be four days of
paid leave (covering regularly scheduled consecutive work days)
and the Company, agreeing that it covers regularly scheduled consecutive work days, claims that it ends with the burial, even if
that takes place before the fourth scheduled work day.
I find no ambiguity in the contract clause. It accords an
eligible employee, for a covered death, "a fully paid leave of
four (4) days for the death in immediate family." It does not, as
the Company implies into that language, give the employee up to
four days, nor does it limit the period to the scheduled work days
between death and burial.
Indeed, the contract clause goes on to provide the exception to the paid leave. It states that
"paid leave for death in the family shall
not be paid to any employee while on sick
leave, leave of absence, vacation, Worker's
Compensation status, regular days off, or
on any other inactive status."
These exceptions do not include the occasion of a shorter
period than four days between death and burial. Had the parties

-3intended to shorten the four days to a shorter period between the
death and burial, they could and should have done so quite easily,
by adding that circumstance to the exceptions or by language that
made the four days a maximum but not a guaranteed quantity. That
they did not limit the four days means to me that an absolute
amount of four days was negotiated and agreed to, for purposes of
"bereavement," irrespective of the actual period of time between
death and burial. And that this was a realistic and equitable
amount of time for bereavement, for funeral arrangements and other
personal obligations attendant to a death in the immediate family,
and importantly,

to comply with the inherent equal treatment re-

quirements of a contract, accords the same benefit to all employee
similarly situated and regardless of religious rules and practices
As the contract clause is clear, the contrary past practice
asserted by the Company, and about which testimony was given, is
immaterial under the well settled rule that clear and unambiguous
contract language prevails over a differing past practice.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The Company violated the contract by not
giving the grievant a fourth day of paid
leave for bereavement. It shall grant
him that fourth day.

Eric j. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: February 20, 1990
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )''
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100, Transport Workers
Union of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service
The issue is:
Is Albert Spivey entitled to vacation pay
and/or a wage accrual for the period July
1, 1988 through October 19, 1989? If so,
to what extent?
A hearing was held on March 19, 1990 at which time Mr.
Spivey, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived. The Company filed a post-hearing brief. The
Union submitted a reply thereto and the Company responded to the
Union's reply.
In addition to vacation pay and wage accrual he received
for the period of his active employment as a line driver (which
eligibility and amount are not in dispute) the grievant seeks
vacation entitlement and/or wage accruals for the period of time
that he was classified as a Board of Education driver, but during
which he was on a ten month disciplinary suspension pursuant to
my earlier Award. In short, the grievant, and the Union on his
behalf, seek the pay and/or accrual "for the time he would have
worked had he not been suspended."
It seems to me that as a matter of contract law and equity,
for the grievant to be accorded the benefit(s) he seeks for and
covering a period that he was on a disciplinary suspension, would
require clear contract authorization or a binding past practice.
I find neither under the instant circumstances.

-2At best, the contract is ambiguous over eligibility for
these benefits for Board of Education drivers.

The contract

accords them on a pro rata basis, under certain circumstances to
"retirees."

The grievant is not a retiree.

gory of "employees,"

Limited to that cate-

it follows, implicitly, that other Board of

Education drivers are not eligible, as least not for the period
of times assigned as Board of Education drivers. Put another way,
I cannot find a requisite clear contract authorization

for pay-

ment of the vacation or wage accrual to and for the period the
grievant was technically classified as a Board of Education
driver, whether or not he was on a disciplinary suspension during
that period. And the latter fact, the suspension, further negates
an equitable result in his favor.
The "past practice" cited by the Union involves incidents
that are factually distinguished or of insufficient consistency
or duration to be precedential.
Vacation pay and/or wage accrual have been granted to employees for periods of Board of Education service who had active
service breaks of short periods of less than ninety days due to
illness or leaves of absence, and up to six months for disabilities
The grievant's case is different. He was disciplinarily suspended
and for ten months.
Another example cited by the Union constitutes a negotiated
exception. Employees were granted credit for a similar disputed
period and service during a cessation of active employment due to
a strike.

The strike settlement included payment of the benefit(s

As such, it does not qualify as a practice that is interpretative
of the contract or as representative of the eligibility terms of
the contract.
Finally, I cannot conclude that the single instance of payment of these disputed benefits to Raymond Miller, for less than
a three month break in service due to a disciplinary award, meets
the test of a consistent, on-going or long standing

practice,

-3which would acquire binding application.
Accordingly, the pro rata vacation pay which the grievant
received for the three week period October 2 through October 19,
1989 was correct, and all to which he was entitled.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The grievance of Albert Spivey for additional vacation pay and/or a wage accrual
for the period July 1, 1988 through October
19, 1989 is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: June 29, 1990
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100, Transport Workers
Union of America

SUPPLEMENTARY
OPINION AND AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

On May 10, 1988 and June 24, 1988 hearings were held before
me in the above matter, the stipulated issue being, "Was there
just cause for the discharge of Antoine Farmer? If not what shall
be the remedy?" Following the submission of evidence and posthearing briefs by both parties, I issued the following AWARD:
"The discharge of Antoine Farmer is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension for the period he has been out. He shall be returned
to the Company's employ, without back pay
in a non-driving, non-operating job, at the
rate of pay of any such job. When the issue
of liability or culpability for the fatality
at West Point is determined, the parties
shall have the right to petition me for further action."
I have been advised by the parties that the civil action relating to the issue of Farmer's liability or culpability with rei
j spect to the accident which occurred at West Point on July 18,
1987 is still pending and is not likely to be concluded for several months or more.

Moreover, counsel for the Union and counsel

for the Employer have advised me that they are not aware of any
outstanding criminal investigation of the West Point accident nor
have any criminal charges been filed against Farmer or any other
| party relating thereto.
In view of the foregoing, the Undersigned, Impartial Chairman, under the collective bargaining agreement between the abovenamed parties hereby makes the following SUPPLEMENTARY AWARD:

-2-

Farmer shall undergo the Employer's
retraining program and upon successfully completing said program will be
assigned to an available run until
the next regular pick.
Farmer shall cooperate fully with
counsel representing him and the
Employer in connection with the
pending civil action including but
not limited to giving testimony at
depositions and the trial of the
matter.
In the event that Farmer is involved
in a chargeable accident within twelve
(12) months of the date of his reinstatement as an operator he shall be
subject to termination. However, such
termination may be grieved and arbitrated
by the Union, in which the issue would
be whether that accident was chargeable.

Eric/LL Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: February 14, 1990
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TWUA -andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
AWARD
LOCAL 100 TWUA
and
NEW YORK BUS SERVICE
--------------------------------------- X
The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Company violated Article
26

of

the

collective

bargaining

agreement by refusing to pay a claim
for dental work filed by Joel Mora?
If so-, what shall be the remedy?
The Union also seeks Mr. Mora's reinstatement.
A hearing was held on November 18, 1991 at which time Mr.
Mora hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representative
of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
At the outset of the hearing, the Company stated that if
it was shown that the dental work was, in fact, performed, the
Company would pay the claim.
Based on the testimony of the grievant 's dentist and the
grievant himself, and with acceptable clarification regarding a

mix-up of dental X-rays submitted to the Company by the dentist's
office, it was convincingly shown that the dental work for which
the grievant has claimed payment under the dental benefit of the
contract, was performed and completed.
Accordingly, the Company shall now pay the grievant his
claim in the amount of $753.00.
The demand' for the grievant's reinstatement is denied.
He was a probationary employee at the time of his dismissal.

In

that status the Company has the contractual right to dismiss him,
without the dismissal being challengeable.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

November 19, 1991

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am-the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TWUA -andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION and AWARD
LOCAL 100 T.W.U.A.

and
NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

The stipulated issues are:
Was there just cause for the five working day
suspension of Linton Walker?
If not, what
shall be the remedy?
Was there just cause for the five day
suspension of Ronald Arnold?
If not, what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on November 19, 1991 at which time
Messrs. Arnold and Walker appeared, together with representatives
of the above-named Union and Company. All concerned were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Linton Walker
Mr. Walker was suspended for his behavior while driving
a group of young students, parents and teachers on a field trip on
June 8, 1990.

It is charged that he was abusive, and rude; berated

the children and the adults; engaged in arguments with one or more
of the adults; and caused some of the children to cry. Also, it is
charged that he drove erratically and that alcohol was detected on
his breath.

A subsequent test of his blood disclosed neither alcohol
nor drugs.

But an analysis of his urine showed the presence of

some alcohol and some marijuana
The

Company

does

metabolite.

not

claim that

he was

under

the

influence of or impaired by alcohol or marijuana while on the field
trip.

Rather it asserts that the result of the urine test is

evidentiary support of the allegations of misbehavior and abusive
and erratic conduct while driving the field trip assignment.
There is little direct evidence on what took place on the
field trip.

None of the teachers or adults who complained appeared

at the hearing.

No one on the trip testified.

Instead, a letter

of complaint, signed by six adults who were on the trip was sent to
the Company (Company Exhibit #4) .
In an earlier decision (May 8, 1989:

Ronald Arnold) I

stated:
"I am not prepared to sustain a disciplinary
penalty on the sole basis of letters of
complaint from pedestrians or the public
without direct supporting testimony subject to
cross-examination.
This is not to say that
the complaining
letters...are untrue but
rather
that
the letters
alone do not
constitute the type of probative evidence
required to meet the requisite standard of
'clear and convincing' evidence. Their truth
cannot be tested, as it should be, in the
adversary setting of live testimony and crossexamination.
Also, the Employer has not
explained why the complainants were not called
to testify in person nor is there any
explanation as to why, if at all, it was not
possible to get them to testify."
The foregoing ruling is equally applicable in the instant
case.

However, certain allegations have been established by
direct or probative evidence.

That the urine test showed some

alcohol content persuades me that the complaint that alcohol was
detected on his breath, is true.

It is well-settled, by prior

decisions and by the care and prudence justifiably required of bus
drivers who transport school children and the general public, that
it is wrong and subject to prohibition for drivers to smell of
alcohol, even if they are not demonstrably impaired or under the
influence.
Also, in his own testimony, Walker admitted that he got
lost on the way to the field trip location and that in response to
a question or observation by a teacher or parent regarding getting
lost, he said to that teacher or parent "calm down and shut up"
(emphasis added).

That the teacher or parent may have touched him

on the shoulder while asking about being lost, is not an excuse for
his intemperate and impolite response.
So, one act of rudeness and the smell of alcohol on his
breath have been proved by the quantum of evidence required in
disciplinary cases.

But the balance of the charges have not been

so established.
Accordingly, some discipline is warranted, but less than
the five day suspension imposed.

I shall reduce the five day

suspension to a two and 1/2 day suspension.

Ronald Arnold
Mr. Arnold is charged with erratic and negligent driving.
Specifically the Company charges that on March 29, 1991, on Route
I 95, Arnold was observed speeding and committing a dangerous

maneuver of abruptly swinging out of one lane into another to pass
a van ahead, and then again abruptly, swing back into the original
lane directly ahead of the van, just before exiting from Route I
95.
The direct evidence in support of the charges came from
John Provetto the Company's Superintendent of Transportation, who
testified that he saw Arnold on Route I 95; followed his bus in his
car, clocking Arnold at the speed of 67 mph.

And from directly

behind him, saw Arnold swing into the center lane from the right
lane, pass the van and then swing abruptly back into the right
lane.
I have no reason to disbelieve Provetto and there is no
reason in the record why his observations are untrue or inaccurate.
I accept them as credible and correct.

Though there were no

passengers in the bus at the time, Arnold's driving, under the
circumstances, and as testified to by Provetto, was improper.

In

view of his prior disciplinary record which includes a number of
accidents and warnings for driving errors, and one suspension (in
1982) for wrongful driving, I do not find it unreasonable for the
Company to have concluded that with the instant incident, his
negligent driving continued.
disciplinary

suspension

of

Therefore, I do not find that a
five

days

was

either

harsh

or

unreasonable.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having

duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARDS:
The five day suspension of Linton Walker is
reduced to- a disciplinary suspension of two
and one-half days. His loss of pay shall be
adjusted accordingly.
The five working day suspension of Ronald
Arnold was for just cause and is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

November 25, 1991

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am.the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
- between NEWSPAPER GUILD OF NEW YORK
(Local 3, AFL-CIO)

OPINION
and
AWARD

- and NEW YORK POST, A DIVISION OF
NEWS GROUP PUBLICATIONS INC.

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the contract by its
failure and refusal to employ Glenn MacDonald
as a regular full-time employee and to pay him
at the required contractual rate of pay and to
provide him with the required contractual
benefits and protections? If so, what shall be
the remedy?
Hearings were held on December 19, 1989, January 12, January
19, February 12, September 26 and November 15, 1990 at which time
Mr. MacDonald, hereinafter referred to as the "Grievant" and
representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

The parties filed post hearing

briefs.

The relevant contract section is that portion of Article XIV,
Section 4 which reads:
_yqucher. employes employed on a
substantially continuous basis shall become
regular full-time or regular part-time
employes on the sixtieth (60th) day following

-2-

the first day of such substantially continuous
employment. Such employes shall receive full
experience credit, calculated as in Article
XXI, for their voucher employment in the same
or substantially similar jobs previously
performed. The ninety (90) day probation
period under Article III, Sec. 2 shall
commence on the date that the employe is
placed on regular status. Service credit
shall be given for all work performed during
the voucher period.
The factual and legal dispute is quite narrow.

It is whether

from the period January through April 1987 the Grievant became or
should have become a "regular full-time ... employe" within the
meaning of the foregoing contract provision.

It is the Union's contention that the Grievant was or should
have been recognized as "a voucher employe" and that during that
period of time he was "assigned to work" for the Company "on a
substantially continuous basis" for 62 days covering stories for
the Company including the important Baby M litigation.

The Union

concludes that under those circumstances the Grievant met all the
reguirements for regular full-time status and that transformation
to that status was triggered and completed.

It is the Company's position that the Grievant was not a
voucher employee during that critical time spread, but rather a
free lance writer or stringer, and that in any event his records
of time spent and stories covered are so inaccurate, so changed
with the passage of time and so inconsistent with his bills for

-3-

services rendered as to lack probative value in determining the
number of days worked and/or whether it was "substantially
continuous."

Certain additional or subsidiary issues were raised at the
arbitration hearings.

The Union claims that the Grievant was

abruptly denied further assignments and foreclosed from further
employment by the Company after he filed the instant grievance and
that that action by the Company was retaliatory, constituting a
"wrongful termination."

In response the Company denies the

retaliation or discrimination charge and explains that as a free
lance writer or stringer the Grievant did not enjoy coverage or
protection under the collective bargaining agreement and that the
Company was free to decide not to use his services further for
whatever reason it chose.

Also, an issue submitted to me, irrespective of outcome of the
basic dispute, is whether the Grievant was paid in full for all
services rendered by him to the Company regardless of his status.
In that connection I made a ruling at the hearing, namely that the
Company should pay him all monies not in dispute and that
representatives of both sides should continue discussions on
payment of the disputed portions.

I reserved jurisdiction to make

final determinations on the disputed claims if the parties could
not resolve that matter by direct negotiations.

-4-

A reading of Article XIV, Section 4 makes clear that the type
of employee eligible to become a regular full-time employee is the
"voucher employe."

Therefore, the threshold question in this

proceeding, and which is disputed at the threshold by the parties,
is whether during the period January through April 1987 the
Grievant was a voucher employee or should have been accorded that
status within the meaning of the contract.

Only if the question

is answered in the affirmative is it necessary to decide whether
he worked 60 days on a substantially continuous basis thereby
meeting the work requirement that would trigger regular full-time
status.

Conversely and obviously, if the threshold question is

answered in the negative, the Grievant's basic complaint must be
denied.

It is undisputed that from around June 1983 to January 1987
the Grievant was "a free lance writer or a stringer."

From the

record it appears that during this period he performed a
considerable amount of work covering stories in New Jersey for the
Company.

Many of those stories were published in the Post with

the Grievant's byline.

Indeed, I accept as accurate the statistic

that the Grievant covered more than 90% of the New Jersey stories
published by the Company over the entire course of his employment.

However, the question is not whether that quantity of work,
with that degree of byline recognition transformed him into a
regular full-time employee.

The question is whether at some point

-5-

his acknowledged free lance/stringer capacity was changed or
should have been changed to that of a voucher employee and whether
during the critical period January through April 1987 he enjoyed
that latter status.

There is no question but that during the measuring period
January through April 1987 the Grievant was not officially or
formally classified as a voucher employee.

However, the Union

argues that constructively or contractually he was a voucher
employee because he was being paid like a voucher employee at the
day rate; that the only significant characteristic of a voucher
employee is that he is paid at the day rate; and that in any event
the Grievant would or should have become a voucher employee
officially but was "prevented" from doing so by Mr. Peter Paris,
the Company's Vice President for Editorial and Administration.

The Company disagrees with the Union's claim that the only
significant characteristic of a voucher employee is his pay at the
day rate.

Instead argues the Company, there are many other

important conditions which obtain to a voucher employee and with
which a voucher employee must comply that were inapplicable to the
Grievant.

The Company points out that unlike the Grievant,

voucher employees are

a.

as the title suggests, required to account for their time

and submit bills for their services on a voucher,
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b.

required to take all assignments given them; required to

call in for a new assignment if the original assignment is
finished before the end of the shift; and while on assignment
required to report in several times a day,

c.

are paid wages from which taxes are withheld and are

reported to the IRS on W2 forms,

d.

have work locations at Company headquarters, or report

there before going out on assignment, and are confined to
covering stories in the City's five boroughs,

e.

are provided with supplies and equipment such as a

beeper, cellular telephone, computer, tape recorder and
stationary,

f.

are prohibited from working for other media organizations

without express Company approval.

Though the contract does not provide a specific definition of
a voucher employee, my review of other parts of Section 4 of
Article XIV reveal other contractual distinctions between the
Grievant and a voucher employee.

For example, sick leave and the

holiday provisions of Section 1 of Article XIV apply to voucher
employees.
Grievant.

There is no evidence of any such application to the
Blue Cross and medical surgical benefits are accorded

-7-

voucher employees.
to the Grievant.
vacation.

There is no evidence of any such application
A voucher employee may qualify for a paid

There is no evidence that any vacation benefits were

being accumulated by or for the Grievant.

The contract requires

that the Company provide the Union with "a continuing record of
... weekly employment showing name, department, classification,
wages and hours worked" of voucher employees.

There is no

evidence that any such data was given to the Union by the Company
about the Grievant.

Nor is there any evidence that the Grievant

or the Union sought any of these.

Basically, the foregoing characteristics of a voucher employee
are not denied by the Union.

Rather, in addition to pointing out

a few exceptions to some of those characteristics (primarily the
requirement that voucher employee's work in or from the Company's
main building) the Union contends in substance that they are
insignificant, representing distinctions not differences and
asserts again that the only true and determinative standard
equally applicable to the Grievant and voucher employees is that
they are both paid the day rate.

And that when, as a result of a

grievance, the Company agreed to pay the Grievant at day rate for
certain important stories covered with consistency during the
critical period (such as Baby M) the Grievant became a voucher
employee.

Alternatively, the Union claims that the Grievant was

improperly prevented from becoming a voucher employee when he
requested vouchers which he wished to use to account for his time
and for billing but was expressly denied that request by Faris.
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I am not prepared to conclude that the foregoing
characteristics are superficial or meaningless.

I think that the

conditions and supervisory constraints imposed on voucher
employees by the Company and generally not applicable to the
Grievant, are managerial determinations within the Company's
managerial prerogatives.

Absent more evidence showing those

factors are inconseguential, managerially ignored or viewed by the
Company as indeterminative, I do not think that an arbitrator
should substitute his judgment for that of the Company and rule
them as insignificant.

Therefore, the requisite quantum of

evidence supporting the Union's burden to show a synonymousness
between the Grievant's working conditions or arrangements and
those required of voucher employees has not been met by the Union
in this case.

More significant to my mind is that the Grievant and the Union
on his behalf had full opportunity to demand official voucher
status for the Grievant and in one instance did not do so and in
the other failed in the attempt.

The Union claims that the

Grievant was prevented by Paris from using voucher forms and
thereby prevented from becoming a voucher employee.

Assuming the

accuracy of the allegation, neither the Grievant nor the Union on
his behalf grieved the denial of that opportunity at that time.
There is no evidence that he was prevented from grieving and no
explanation why the issue at that time was not put to the
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adjudicatory test.

Secondly, when a grievance had been or was

filed on March 4, 1987 claiming both voucher status and
entitlement to pay at the day rate for the Grievant, that
grievance was either resolved or terminated by the single
agreement or action of paying the Grievant at the day rate,
particularly for coverage of the Baby M trial.

But there was no

agreement to classify the Grievant as a voucher employee.
claim was either denied, abandoned or withdrawn.

That

Also, there was

no agreement or action on the Union's additional demand in that
grievance for payment to "the appropriate Guild funds ... (of) the
amounts covered on his voucher time for the Baby M trial ...."
That the claim for voucher status was not thereafter pursued means
to my mind that payment of the day rate, not voucher employee
status, was acceptable to the Grievant and to the Union.

Most

significantly therefore, the bare payment at day rate was not
eguivalent to or synonymous with voucher employee status and not
enough to make the Grievant a voucher

employee.

In short, I do not find enough in this record to grant to the
Grievant or to the Union on his behalf something that they failed
to achieve or pursue through the grievance procedure.

Hence,

despite the magnitude of his work during the critical period of
January to April 1987 and despite the importance and guality of
much of that reporting, I cannot find that the Grievant's status
had changed from that of a free lance reporter or stringer.

-10-

Let me say that I am persuaded that the Grievant is a very
capable reporter who worked competently and diligently on
assignments given to him by the Company.

He is to be commended

for other good work in initiating stories which the Company
published.

Indeed the quality of his work was recognized by

awards which he received from reputable and professional
journalistic groups.

That he was once identified in a Company

publication as a "Post reporter" is evidence of his recognized
abilities.

But that identity, like the I.D. card given the

Grievant is too limited and ambiguous to transform him from a free
lancer to something more permanent.

In that capacity the Grievant was not "discharged or
terminated" in violation of Article XIII of the contract.

I

cannot conclude that as a free lance reporter he enjoyed job
security protection under that contractual Article.

This is only

to say that the Company's decision not to use the Grievant further
is not actionable under the collective bargaining

agreement.

Whether it is actionable on any other legal theory or in any other
legal forum is not before me and the rights of all parties in that
regard are fully reserved.

But, as already stated, diligence,

competence, continuity and peer recognition do not constitute
contractual elements of voucher employee status and neither,
standing alone, is payment for repertorial services at the day
rate.

Accordingly, as I have found that the Grievant was not a

voucher employee during the critical period within the meaning of

-11Article XIV Section 4, it is immaterial whether he worked on a
substantially continuous basis for the requisite 60 days.

If the parties are jointly willing, I am prepared to determine
any remaining dispute over whether the Grievant has been fully
paid for work performed, if resolution of any such remaining
dispute is not effectuated by the parties themselves.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties
makes the following Award:
The Company did not violate the contract by its
failure and refusal to employ Glenn MacDonald as a
regular full-time employee and to pay him at the
required contractual rate of pay and to provide him
with the required contractual benefits and
protections.

ERIC J. SCHMERTZ
Arbitrator
Dated: March 7, 1991
New York, New York

DATED:
STATE OF New York
County of New York

)
ss:
)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
X
In The Matter of the Arbitration
-betweenOPINION AND AWARD

LOCAL 365, CEMETERY WORKERS

Case #13300 0046891

-and-

PINELAWN CEMETERY
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the suspension of TOMAS
CORDERO? If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on October 11, 1991 at which time Mr.
Cordero hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representative of
the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The grievant is charged with negligently damaging a concrete
liner on March 4, 1991 when, in performing his job assignment he picked
it up with a fork lift truck from its storage location and transported
it to a grave site.
The Employer's case against grievant and for which the threeday suspension was imposed, is circumstantial.

It is well settled that

circumstantial evidence, if adeguately probative and persuasive, can
support and affirm a disciplinary charge and penalty.

But, its

probative and persuasive guality must satisfy the Employer's burden in
discipline cases, namely the burden of establishing the case by evidence
that is clear and convincing.

In the instant case, there is a measure of circumstantial
i
evidence pointing to the grievant's cupability. But one critical

^'

element of that case, which the Employer only alleged but did not prove,
and which was within his control to adduce, leaves the circumstantial
case short of the requisite clear and convincing standard.
There is no direct evidence on what happened on March 4th.
There is no testimony that anyone saw the grievant pick up the liner at
its storage area.

There is no testimony on how he used the fork lift

truck to lift the liner from that location and transport it to the grave
site.

There is no direct evidence that the grievant caused any damage.

Only at the grave site was the damage to the liner discovered, and it
was noted and reported to management by the grievant himself.
The Employer claims that the grievant must have used the fork
lift negligently; must have tilted the liner or brought it into contact
with another liner at the storage location, causing cracks in its
concrete and damage to its cover; must have extended the forks of the
truck too far under the liner, thereby causing it (and the one adjacent)
to be roughly jolted, resulting in the particular damage involved.
The grievant denies the charge in its entirety, and testified
that he did not know how the damage occurred and that he first noticed
it at the grave site.
The Employer's conclusions are based on two other events and
some additional arguments.
grievant

It introduced evidence showing that the

damaged a liner a few days earlier on February 28, for which he was
formally warned and suspended for the balance of that day (i.e. a three
quarter day suspension)1 and his observed negligence also on March 4th,
shortly after the alleged disciplinary offense, when he went back to the
storage area to get another liner, apparently to replace the one that
was damaged.2
Finally, to counter the Union's argument that the liners could
have been damaged when delivered by the supplier and when placed in the
storage area side by side, virtually touching each other, or from other
pick ups on other days, the Employer asserts that a foreman inspects the
liners at the storage location each evening; that such an inspection
took place on March 3rd and all liners were reported to be in good
condition for use on March 4th.
While I appreciate the probabilities inherent in the foregoing
arguments, I am not persuaded that the circumstances dispel what is
otherwise speculative about what the grievant did on March 4th, or add
up to the probative persuasiveness that clearly or convincingly ties the
grievant to the damage discovered on March 4th.
The critical flaw in the Employer's case is its bare
allegation, but not proof, that the liners were inspected on the evening
of March 3rd and found in good shape.

The foreman, who the Employer

claims made the inspection, was not called as a witness to testify.

Nor

was there any testimony that such inspections are a regular practice.

-"•As neither he nor the Union objected to the three quarter
day suspension or the charge that he damaged a liner that day,
the charge and penalty are now conclusive and unchallengeable.
f\e is direct testimony by supervision that they saw him

misuse the fork lift truck; that the forks were out of line; that
upon lifting the liner it tilted and almost smashed into another
liner adjacent; and that damage was avoided only because the
foreman stopped him from continuing.

Had there been such testimony, and had I found it acceptable, I might
well have concluded that with that piece of circumstantial evidence, the
quantum, quality and coincidences were adequate to draw the inference
that would affirm the Employer's case.

But absent the proof of this

third element, the other two in my judgment fall short of dispelling
some reasonable questions and reasonable and different possibilities
about what happened on March 4th, how the damage occurred, and what the
condition of the liner was before and when the grievant picked it up
that morning.

Put another way, though the grievant was negligent on

February 28th and was seen working carelessly or wrongfully later on
March 4th, I cannot conclude that the particular damage to the
particular liner on March 4th was done by the grievant and was not a
pre-existing condition caused when the liner was delivered by the
supplier or caused on other days when liners were picked up and
transported.

Because these latter explanations are reasonably possible

and because there is no direct evidence of the grievant's negligence at
the critical time on March 4th, I cannot find that he was at fault by
evidence that is clear and convincing.

Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties makes the following AWARD:
There was not just cause for the three day
suspension of TOMAS CORDERO.

The suspension shall

be espunged from his record and he shall be made
whole for the time lost.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

November 8, 1991

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER

The Port Authority of
New York & New Jersey
In the Matter of the
Disciplinary Hearings

DECISION
Dockets 763 and 764

of
Gerald Anderson and
Robert Taylor

The Charges and Specifications against Gerald Anderson are:
Substantial violation of the General Rules and Regulations
for All Port Authority Employees.
SPECIFICATION 1
On October 3, 1991 you appeared at the World Trade Center
and presented yourself as a candidate in the Toll Collector Promotional Evaluation. You represented that you were another employee, named Robert Taylor, by signing the "Test Attendance
Roster for Promotional Evaluations" as "Robert Taylor" and by
participating in the written test as "Robert Taylor." Consequently, the said written test results were attributed to Mr. Taylor
and he was provided with the opportunity to participate in the nexf;
phase of the evaluation.
This action is in violation of the General Rules and
Regulations for All Port Authority Employees, Chapter 2, Ethics,
General, Paragraph 3, which provides, 'It is imperative that
employees be honest an accurate. In presenting information, if
you are not sure of all the facts or details, or their completeness, be sure to indicate the limits for which you can vouch for
its accuracy." and Chapter 4, Public Relations, Paragraph 1,
which provides, "No employee shall commit any act or neglect any
duty which in any way is prejudicial to good order, discipline,
or efficiency, or reflects unfavorably upon the good name or
reputation of the Port authority or those of the general public,
whether or not such act or neglect is specifically mentioned in
these rules."
SPECIFICATION 2
On October 3, 1991 you were scheduled to work as a Toll
Collector at the George Washington Bridge. You did not report to
duty that day as you had reported that you were sick during the
period from October 2~4, 1991. Nevertheless, you appeared at the
World Trade Center on October 3, 1991, as indicated in the specification above. Subsequently, in November of 1991, you stated to
members of the Audit Department staff that you were not actually
sick on that date.

IMPARTIAL HEARING

OFFICER

The Port Authority of
New York & New Jersey
In the Matter of the
Disciplinary Hearings

DECISION
Dockets 763 and 764

of

Gerald Anderson and
Robert Taylor

The Charges and Specifications against Gerald Anderson are:
Substantial violation of the General Rules and Regulations
for All Port Authority Employees.
SPECIFICATION 1
On October 3, 1991 you appeared at the World Trade Center
and presented yourself as a candidate in the Toll Collector Promotional Evaluation. You represented that you were another employee, named Robert Taylor, by signing the "Test Attendance
Roster for Promotional Evaluations" as "Robert Taylor" and by
participating in the written test as "Robert Taylor." Consequently, the said written test results were attributed to Mr. Taylor
and he was provided with the opportunity to participate in the nex
phase of the evaluation.
This action is in violation of the General Rules and
Regulations for All Port Authority Employees, Chapter 2, Ethics,
General, Paragraph 3, which provides, It is imperative that
employees be honest an accurate. In presenting information, if
you are not sure of all the facts or details, or their completeness, be sure to indicate the limits for which you can vouch for
its accuracy." and Chapter 4, Public Relations, Paragraph 1,
which provides, "No employee shall commit any act or neglect any
duty which in any way is prejudicial to good order, discipline,
or efficiency, or reflects unfavorably upon the good name or
reputation of the Port authority or those of the general public,
whether or not such act or neglect is specifically mentioned in
these rules."
SPECIFICATION 2
On October 3, 1991 you were scheduled to work as a Toll
Collector at the George Washington Bridge. You did not report to
duty that day as you had reported that you were sick during the
period from October 2~4, 1991. Nevertheless, you appeared at the
World Trade Center on October 3, 1991, as indicated in the specification above. Subsequently, in November of 1991, you stated to
members of the Audit Department staff that you were not actually
sick on that date.

-2This is in violation of the General Rules and Regulations
for All Port Authority Employees, Chapter 5, Doing the Job,
General Duties, Paragraph 1, which provides, An employee must
maintain an acceptable standard of performance in order to be
retained in his position." and Chapter 2, Ethics, General, Paragraph 3, which provides, "It is imperative that employees be
honest an accurate. In presenting information, if you are not
sure of all the facts or details, or their completeness, be sure
to indicate the limits for which you can vouch for its accuracy.'
The Charge and Specification against Robert Taylor is:
Substantial violation of the General Rules and Regulations
for All Port authority employees.
SPECIFICATION I
On October 3, 1991 you were scheduled to appear at the
World Trade Center as a candidate in the Toll Collector Promotional Evaluation.
You failed to appear for said test but instead
arranged for another employee, Toll Collector Gerald Anderson, to
appear in your stead. Mr. Anderson with your knowledge and concurrence, represented that he was Robert Taylor by signing the
jj "Test Attendance Roster for Promotional Evaluations" as "Robert
j: Taylor", and by participating in the written test as "Robert
Taylor."
Consequently, the said written test results were
attributed to you and you were provided with the opportunity to
participate in the next phase of the evaluation.
This action is in violation of the General Rules and
Regulations for All Port Authority Employees, Chapter 2, Ethics
General, Paragraph 3, which provides, It is imperative that
employees be honest an accurate. In presenting information, if
you are not sure of all the facts or details, or their completeness, be sure to indicate the limits for which you can vouch for
its accuracy." and Chapter 4, Public Relations, Paragraph 1,
which provides, "No employee shall commit any act or neglect any
duty which in any way is prejudicial to good order, discipline,
or efficiency, or reflects unfavorably upon the good name or
reputation of the port Authority or those of the general public,
whether or not such act or neglect is specifically mentioned in
these rules . "
A hearing was held on December 12, 1991 at which time Messrs.
I

Anderson and Taylor appeared and were represented by their Union
Local 1400 TWUA.

Representatives of the Authority also appeared.

At the hearing, Anderson and Taylor admitted the Charges and
Specifications.

Their explanations are not acceptable excuses.

-3-

Accordingly, the Charges and Specifications are sustained.
I agree with the Authority that the misconduct involved
constitutes fraud and a serious violation of the Authority's
General Rules and Regulations and is a dischargeable offense.
Therefore, the Authority's request that Anderson and Taylor be
discharged, is granted.

Eric A. Schmertz
Impartial Hearing Officer
; DATED: December 24, 1991
jj STATE OF: New York
COUNTY OF: New York
,i
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
jj Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
ij executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

-2This is in violation of the General Rules and Regulations
for All Port Authority Employees, Chapter 5, Doing the Job,
General Duties, Paragraph 1, which provides, An employee must
maintain an acceptable standard of performance in order to be
retained in his position." and Chapter 2, Ethics, General, Paragraph 3, which provides, "It is imperative that employees be
honest an accurate. In presenting information, if you are not
sure of all the facts or details, or their completeness, be sure
to indicate the limits for which you can vouch for its accuracy.'
The Charge and Specification against Robert Taylor is:
Substantial violation of the General Rules and Regulations
for All Port authority employees.
SPECIFICATION 1
On October 3, 1991 you were scheduled to appear at the
World Trade Center as a candidate in the Toll Collector Promotional Evaluation. You failed to appear for said test but instead
arranged for another employee, Toll Collector Gerald Anderson, to
appear in your stead. Mr. Anderson with your knowledge and concurrence, represented that he was Robert Taylor by signing the
"Test Attendance Roster for Promotional Evaluations" as "Robert
Taylor", and by participating in the written test as "Robert
Taylor." Consequently, the said written test results were
attributed to you and you were provided with the opportunity to
participate in the next phase of the evaluation.
This action is in violation of the General Rules and
Regulations for All Port^Authority Employees, Chapter 2, Ethics,
General, Paragraph 3, which provides, "It is imperative that
employees be honest an accurate. In presenting information, if
you are not sure of all the facts or details, or their completeness, be sure to indicate the limits for which you can vouch for
its accuracy." and Chapter 4, Public Relations, Paragraph 1,
which provides, "No employee shallcommit any act or neglect any
duty which in any way is prejudicial to good order, discipline,
or efficiency, or reflects unfavorably upon the good name or
reputation of the port Authority or those of the general public,
whether or not such act or neglect is specifically mentioned in
these rules."
A hearing was held on December 12, 1991 at which time Messrs.
Anderson and Taylor appeared and were represented by their Union
Local 1400 TWUA.

Representatives of the Authority also appeared.

At the hearing, Anderson and Taylor admitted the Charges and
Specifications.

Their explanations are not acceptable excuses.
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Accordingly, the Charges and Specifications are sustained.
I agree with the Authority that the misconduct involved
constitutes fraud and a serious violation of the Authority's
General Rules and Regulations and is a dischargeable offense.
Therefore, the Authority's request that Anderson and Taylor be
discharged, is granted.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Hearing Officer
DATED: December 24, 1991
STATE OF: New York
COUNTY OF: New York
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 144, S.E.I.U.

FINAL

AWARD

and
Sea Crest Health Care Center

This is my Final Award with respect to all arbitration
proceedings held before me between Sea Crest Health Care Center,
Employer and Local 144, S.E.I.U.
concerning contract issues hereinafter described.
As previously indicated in my prior Interim Awards concerning this matter, the Undersigned was designated by agreement
between the parties, as interest Arbitrator, to determine, to the
extent that the parties were unable to do so themselves, the terms
and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement between them
to be effective from April 1, 1984 through March 31, 1987.
In addition to the foregoing, the Undersigned has been
designated as interest Arbitrator to determine the collective bargaining agreement between the parties for the period April 1, 1987
through September 30, 1991.
Regarding the foregoing, each of the parties has presented
to me, during the course of long and extensive hearings held in
these matters, evidence and testimony, including financial analyse
and accounting memoranda relating to the issues of reimbursement
and affordability of Sea Crest Health Care Center for the periods
involved herein.
In addition, each of the parties have submitted to me
drafts of proposed contract provisions for the period April 1, 198
through March 31, 1987, and have further submitted to me draft
proposals for the contract provisions for the period April 1, 1987
through September 30, 1991.
This Award represents a Final Award with reference to all
of the issues that have been heretofore submitted to me, to wit,
the contract provisions for the initial contract period April 1,
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1984, through March 31, 1987; the contract provisions of the subsequent contract for the period April 1, 1987, through September
30, 1991; as well as final arbitration determinations concerning
wages and fund contributions to be paid by Sea Crest Health Care
Center to the applicable Local 144 Pension and Welfare Funds
during the initial contract period as well as the subsequent contract period.
This Final Award, therefore, supersedes any and all prior
awards that have been issued by me with respect to these proceedings including but not limited to my prior Interim Awards dated
May 3, 1986, July 20, 1987, and September 5, 1989.
With respect to the contract period April 1, 1984, through
March 31, 1987, I Award as follows:
A. Wages
1. Paragraph 3A (1, 2, 3, and 3A) of my
Award dated May 3, 1986, is hereby modified as follows:
a. There shall be immediately payable
to all employees a lump sum payment as
follows:
Blue Collar
L.P.N.

$275.00
$375.00

b. Effective July 15, 1984, through
and including December 31, 1984, there
shall be a 6%% lump sum award to all covered
employees for work actually performed during
such period.
j

2. Effective April 1, 1985, through and ineluding March 31, 1986, there shall be a 4%
lump sum award for all covered employees for
work actually performed during the period.
3. Effective July 1, 1986, through and including March 31, 1987, there shall be a 4%
lump sum award for all covered employees for
work actually performed during such period.
Any and all payments made on account of the above awards

-3either pursuant to my prior Interim Awards or otherwise, shall
be credited towards the amounts due as above described.
All sums due in accordance with the above determinations
shall be for work actually performed by all covered employees.
Payment of all sums due to be made in accordance with the
above determinations shall be made to all covered employees within 60 days from the date thereof.
With respect to fund contributions for the period April
1, 1984, through March 31, 1987, I do hereby determine as follows
A. Paragraph 3f of my Award of May 3, 1986,
is hereby modified as follows:
The Employer's obligation to make Pension,
Welfare and other benefit fund contributions
shall be the same as the obligation of employer members of the Southern New York Residential Health Care Facilities Association, Inc.,
as set forth in the November 30, 1984 Agreement
as modified in the April 1989 Agreement between
the parties, except as follows:
1. The Employer's contribution base shall
continue at the contribution base in effect
on September 30, 1980.
2. The 2% (Pension) contribution reduction
provided under such Agreement shall, in the
case of the Employer, be 1.1666%.
3. The language and determination described
under "Benefit Improvements" in my Award of
May 3, 1986, is hereby ratified and confirmed.
B. Except as modified herein, I do hereby
ratify and confirm all other terms and conditions stated in my Award of May 3, 1986, under
Paragraphs 1 through 4 inclusive.
D. With respect to the contract provisions for
the period April 1, 1987, through September 30,
1991, I do hereby determine that the governing
contract provisions between the parties shall
be these described in the attached contract,
which contract provisions are incorporated by
reference as part of my Award herein, as though
the same were more fully set forth at length
herein.
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Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 12, 1990
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 144, S.E.I.U.
FINAL

AWARD

and
Shoreview Nursing Home
This Award represents a final determination with regard
to all issues that have been submitted to me concerning "Reimbursement" and/or "Affordability" with regard to the contract
years 1984, 1985 and 1986 commencing April 1, 1984, through March
31, 1987. As such, this Award supersedes any and all prior Interim Awards heretofore determined herein.
i
Both of the parties have submitted extensive evidence to
me including documents, records, testimony and financial analyses
concerning the many issues that are involved in making arbitral
determinations of "Reimbursement" and "Affordability" for the
periods heretofore described.
I have reviewed in detail, the terms and conditions of
the contracts entered into between the parties, and more particularly the "Reimbursement clause" and other provisions of the
contracts, as amended by the parties, that relate to all of the
foregoing.
I have also examined the positions advanced by both partie
as to the methodology or methodologies that are relevant and many
sophisticated legal and accounting theories proposed by each of
the parties with respect to the facts.
After review of all of the above, I do hereby AWARD as
follows:
A. Fund Contributions
I decline to grant any relief to Shoreview
Nursing Home for each and all of the years of
the contract including April 1, 1984, through
March 31, 1987. As such, Shoreview shall be
required to make all contributions required to
be made under the contract executed between the
parties in November, 1984, as amended April 1989

-2for the period April 1, 1984,
March 31, 1987.

through

B. Wages
With respect to all wages and lump sums
due under the November 1984 contract and
the April 1989 contract, for the period
April 1, 1984, through March 31, 1987, I
do hereby determine as follows:
1. Shoreview shall pay a lump sum of 6~l/2%
to all covered employees for all periods
actually worked by covered employees for the
period July 15, 1984, through December 31,
1984.
2. Shoreview shall pay a lump sum of 5% to
all covered employees for all periods actually
worked by all covered employees for the period
April 15, 1985, through April 14, 1986.
3. Shoreview shall pay a lump sum of 4% for
all periods actually worked by all covered
employees for the period July 15, 1986, until
the expiration of the contract.
4. Payment of the above sums shall be made
to all covered employees within 60 days of
the date hereof.
5. Any and all monies paid to any employee or
employees during the pendency of this proceeding, either pursuant to any prior Interim Award
or otherwise, shall be credited against the
amounts due under this Award.

DATED: March 12, 1990
STATE OF New York ss
COUNTY OF New York
Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD
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Frank McKinney
Concurring
Dissenting
DATED: March
1990
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Frank McKinney do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: March ^^1990 i&£STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )'ss
I, Herbert Rothman do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARJ

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 550, I.B.T.

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 1294 87

and
Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., Inc.
The parties were unable to agree on a stipulated issue:
The Union presented the issue as:
May the Employer require route sales persons
and route riders to sticker Stell D'Oro bakery products delivered or to be delivered to
customers?
If not, what shall be the remedy?
The Union seeks a cease and desist order.
The Company poses the issue as:
Is stickering properly part of the job to be
performed by route sales persons and route
riders in servicing their routes? If not,
what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held on November 16, 1988, July 21, 1989,
October 3 and 4, 1989 at which time representatives of the abovenamed Union and Company appeared and were given full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived, and each side filed
a post-hearing brief.
I propose to answer both the foregoing issues, in reverse
order.
"Stickering" is the placement in retail stores and commissaries of a price sticker over the regular price on a package.
Usually, a stickering "gun" or prepared, gummed stickers are used.
The reduced sales price has no effect on the employees commissions

-2He continues to get commissions on the original, regular price.
The best evidence of whether a duty is properly part of a
particular job is a jointly negotiated job description or specification.
ment.

There are none under this collective bargaining agree-

The next best evidence would be job descriptions or speci-

fications unilaterally promulgated by the Company and accepted by
the Union and/or worked under by the employees of the bargaining
unit. Again, there are none in this collective bargaining relationship. The next best evidence, in my view, are the actual
duties performed by the employees involved in the regular course
of their employment. Those duties which are regularly and routinely performed by all or a significant percentage of those employees, would by practice, be duties that are properly part of
the job. Also, those duties, which though perhaps not regular or
routinely performed by all or most of the employees, but which on
some persuasive evidentiary basis can be assigned to the employees
and which they are expected to perform if so assigned, would also
be properly part of the job job.
Based on the record before me, I am not persuaded that the
stickering in dispute here, meets any of the above tests
criteria.

or

In sum, the Company has shown that some, but only a relatively few employees in the unit, have done stickering at all. Becaus
stickering is generally requested by the store or customer served,
as a sale or promotional method, or to otherwise stimulate sales
only those locations making the request of the Company to have
the drivers and riders assume that duty, are or have been the
locations or stops at which the disputed activity may be performed
Indeed, the Company acknowledges that at present only 17 of the
67 routes require periodic stickering and that only 70 of its
approximately 7000 stops serviced over a two week period require
stickering.

-3So, at present, a majority of employees in the unit do not
sticker, are not yet asked to do so by their customers, and are
not yet "required" or "expected" to do so by the Company.
As to the locations where stickering is requested by the
customer, the Company explains that an accommodation of those
requests "in the real world of product sales distribution," is
necessary, otherwise "there is no sale."
As to those stops requiring or requesting stickering, the
Company has shown that some stickering has been done by some employees. Some have done so at the request of the customer.
Some
have done so at the direction of the Company. Some have refused
to do so, or stopped doing so and have not been disciplined. It
appears, from the record, that some stickering has been done,
voluntarily, by practice, or by Company direction since 1984 at
discount stores, and earlier at commissaries. Though I agree
with the Company that the Union knew of this work, sometimes objecting, and sometimes not, I cannot find that the act of stickering was so consistently performed by the employees or required
by the Company, or accepted or acquiesced by the Union, to constitute a recognition that it was a regular, routine part of the
route sales person and rider job classifications, or that it
should be prescriptively deemed as a part of those ]ob classifications .
The Company argues that stickering is not different than a
host of other activities and functions performed by the employee,
such as putting up display stands, soliciting new accounts, suggesting improved positions for the product and shelf unit pricing.
It points out that the duty to sticker is no more a variation in
the job classification than for example, changes in delivery times
specified by the customer, changes in delivery locations at the
store, changes in displays, log sheet sign in, ticketing of bulk
items, bad check collections, and resetting of shelves, all of
which have taken placed over the years without Union objection.

-4If the Company is correct in this analogy, that runs to
whether it can add stickering to the job, or require that stickering be performed as part of the job, not whether it is now part
of the iob.

and that relates to the other issue posed.

My authority as Arbitrator is confined to the contract. I
do not have nor was I given the power to interpret or apply the
National Labor Relations Act to the instant situation. So the remaining issue before me is whether under the collective bargaining
agreement the Company may require the employees to do stickering;
recognizing that such requirement would be the addition of that
i duty to the job classification. The issue is not whether under
the National Labor Relations act stickering is a "condition of
employment" within the meaning of the Act, and that the Company
must bargain with the Union before implementing the requirement.
On that latter point, because it is beyond my authority as the
Arbitrator, I make no determinations whatsoever, and the rights
of the parties under the Act are expressly reserved.
However, as to the contract, I find no contractual prohibition on the Company's right to determine and make job content
changes to meet changed marketing and distributing circumstances.
I think, under the contract, this remains a managerial right,
whether or not there is an express management rights clause in the
contract. And if a change in the job content, such as the addition
of the duty of stickering, affects the earnings of the employees
or represents physical or operational burdens, the Union has the
right not to prevent stickering, but to redress those matters or
"impact" by collective bargaining.
Article I Section (C) does not bar the Company from changing
the job content of a classification. It only bars the Company
from making "agreements or arrangements with employees regarding
working conditions" (emphasis added), rather than negotiating
such matters with the Union. But it does not bar the Company from
the unilateral promulgation of job content changes, applicable to
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a job classification and all employees in that classification.
That is not a proscribed "private" agreement or arrangement with
employees inconsistent with the contract.
It seems to me that if the contract was to require bargaining on all proposed changes in job content before any such changes
were implemented, Article I Section (C) would have been the location in which it should have been placed. Logically, if the
Company is expressly barred from making agreements or arrangements
inconsistent with the contract directly with employees, any intent
to similarly prohibit the Company from making job changes affecting a classification or all employees in that classification without first bargaining with the Union, could and should have been
similarly legislated. And no such limitation is found here or
elsewhere in the contract.
More in point, and more supportive of the Union's case are
three Letters of Understanding in the contract, which, respectively represent jointly negotiated agreements on the "delivery, set
up and packing out of 36" and 48" display stands"; "maintaining
running inventories in the Company'sroute books," and on "the
practice of charging out and reimbursing route salesmen for the
return of packing cartons."
The Union contends that these Letters show that on changes i
or additions to the job duties of a route sales person, the Company has negotiated and is obligated to negotiate first with the
Union. Certainly those Letters show that the Company has negotiated with the Union on certain elements or requirements of the
route sales person job, but absent other probative evidence or
any express contract requirement on threshold bargaining, I am
not prepared to conclude or infer that these Letters also represent an obligation to negotiate before job content is changed.
Put another way, I recognize and even applaud the policy of
discussion and negotiation of job duties as good labor relations
practice, but, in the instant case, I cannot find that three in-

-6stances of such negotiations is determinative evidence of a contract duty to do so in all instances.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
1.

Stickering is not now properly part of
the job to be performed by route sales
persons and route riders.

2.

Under the contract, the Employer may
add stickering to the duties of the
route sales persons and route riders
and then may require said employees
to sticker Stella D'Oro bakery products
delivered to or to be delivered to
customers. This ruling in no way considers or makes any determinations regarding a duty to bargain on a condition
of employment under the National Labor
Relations Act, and the rights of the
parties in such regard, factually and
legally, are expressly reserved.
However, distinguished from any alleged
duty under the Act to bargain before implementing stickering, matters or "impact" arising from the implementation of
stickering, are matters for collective
bargaining.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 28, 1990
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Technicolor Film Laboratory

The stipulated issue is:
Is Philip Lamendola entitled to the job as
a working foreman in the negative developing department? If so what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on March 23, 1990 at which time Mr.
Lamendola, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
In May 1989, Vincent Villane retired from the position of
working foreman in the negative developing department.

Prior

to his retirement there were two working foremen in the development department - Villane in negative developing and Vincent
Masillo, in positive developing.
With Villane's retirement, the Company chose not to replace
him, but rather assigned Masillo to cover both negative and positive developing, as working foreman. Because of that staffing
decision, the grievant's bid for the job vacated by Villane was
denied by the Company and his grievance, which is the subject of
this arbitration, followed.
It is the Union's position that historically and by practice, there has been a working foreman assigned to each department, one in negative developing and one in positive developing.

-2As the departments are separate, with separate overtime and vacation charts, the elimination of a working foreman for the negative
department exclusively, was improper.

And because the grievant

was the most senior negative developer and had performed the working foreman job when Villane was on vacation or otherwise out,
he was entitled to the job, and that its actual or constructive
elimination by the Company, with the appointment of Masillo as
the working foreman for both departments, to save money, was
improper.
The Company denies that there has always been a separate
working foreman for each department.

It points out, without

refutation by the Union, that for a two year period, from 1987 to
1989, Villane was the working foreman covering both the negative
and positive departments following the retirement of Ben Helfman
as working foreman in the positive department in 1987. Additionally, the Company points out, again without dispute from the Union
that six departments do not have working foremen, namely cleaning,
projection, expediting, timing, shipping and chemical mixing.
The Company also defends its action on the reduced complement in the positive crews. Prior to 1982, there were six positive crews. In 1982 and through the present, the positive
developing complement was reduced to and has been two. On that
basis, argues the Company it does not need two working foremen;
that one is adequate to supervise the work of both departments.
Finally, the Company claims that its action to appoint one
working foreman for both departments was discussed with and agreed
to by the then local union president and steward.

Specifically,

because Masillo was the most senior employee, plant-wide, (i.e.
in both departments), and on that basis, senior to the grievant,
it was agreed that he would get the job.
I understand the grievant's frustration.

There is no doubt

that he is qualified for the working foreman position.

I further
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understand and respect his belief that because he has seniority
in the negative developing department, and because there was a
predecessor working foreman in that department, he should have
been appointed as the successor.
However, the issue before me is not an equitable one, but
rather whether the Company's staffing decision violated the contract or uniform past practice. I find that it did not. I find
nothing in the contract that requires a working foreman in each of
the negative and positive departments. Article 16(d) of the contract prohibits the Company from:
"increasing the number of Working Foremen
or Sub-Foremen without the consent of
the Union" (emphasis added).
Impliedly, therefore, there is no contract bar or limitation
on the Company's right to decrease working foremen unilaterally.
Indeed, if it was the intent of the parties to bar any such reduction, or to maintain a fixed basic crew of working foremen,
those constraints could have and should have been included in
Article 16(d).
Moreover, the Union's reliance on past practice is not supported by the undisputed facts. For two years, from 1987 to 1989,
both departments were covered by a single working foreman. Also,
any binding practice and hence requirement that each department
have a working foreman, is effectively negated by the fact that
six other departments do not have working foremen at all.
Finally, the Company has shown a logical and rational operational basis for its decision. The crew sizes have been significantly reduced, making reasonable the present coverage of both
departments with one working foreman. That it may represent a
cost saving to the Company is not wrong, because it parallels
and reflects that reduction in crew complement, and is therefore
justified.

-4With the foregoing analysis, I cannot find a contract or
practice violation by the Company's decision to assign a working foreman job, covering both the negative and positive departments, to Masilla, who holds greater Company-wide seniority than
the grievant. Therefore I need not make any determinations regarding any alleged agreements between the Company and prior
union leadership.
The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
Philip Lamendola is not entitled to the job
as a working foreman in the negative developing department.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 3, 1990
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) s ° - I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Robert T. Klan

and

A W A R D
Grievance #6112

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators in
the above-named matter, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, make the following

AWARD

There was not just cause for the discharge
of Robert T. Klan. His discharge is reduced to a five day disciplinary suspension. He shall be reinstated with back
pay less five days pay for the suspension,
and less his earnings, if any, from gainful employment elsewhere from the date of
his discharge to the date of his reinstatement .

DATED: October 2— 1991
STATE OF
New York
COUNTY OF
New York

Eric Y.Schmertz
Cha vi man

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who exethis instrument, which is my AWARD.

7
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DATED: October '
1991
STATE OF
New York

Cullen
(Concurring)

;
I, Robert Cullen do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
I Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who exei cuted this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: October f 1991
STATE OF
New York
COUNTY

OF

<

I, J. Roger Shields do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Robert T. Klan
and

A W A R D
Grievance #6112

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators in
the above-named matter, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, make the following AWARD.
There was not just cause for the discharge
of Robert T. Klan. His discharge is reduced to a five day disciplinary suspension. He shall be reinstated with back
pay less five days pay for the suspension,
and less his earnings, if any, from gainful employment elsewhere from the date of
his discharge to the date of his reinstatement .

DATED: October
1991
STATE OF
New York
COUNTY OF
New York

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: October
1991
STATE OF
New York
COUNTY

Robert Cullen
(Concurring)(Dissenting)

I, Robert Cullen do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: October
1991
STATE OF
New York
COUNTY OF

J. Roger Shields
(Dissenting)(Concurring)

I, J. Roger Shields do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Robert T. Klan
and

OPINION OF
CHAIRMAN
Grievance #6112

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of Robert Klan? If not, what shall be
the remedy?
Hearings were held at the Company offices on September
3 and September 11, 1991 at which time Mr. Klan, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," his attorney Ronald A. Longo, Esq.
and representatives of Trans World Airlines, Inc., hereinafter
referred to as the Company, including its counsel, Victor Lampasso
Esq., appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Board of Arbitration consisted of Mr. J. Roger

Shields, Company designee; Mr. Robert Cullen, grievant designee,
and the Undersigned, as Chairman.
waived.

The Arbitrators' Oath was

The Board of Arbitration met in executive session on

September 27, 1991.
At the point of his discharge, the grievant was a
security officer.

The charges against him, and the grounds for

his discharge, as recited by Company counsel in his opening
statement, are:
1. The grievant's failure to deliver a
package to Mr. Icahn's office.

-22. Making false log entries in the
Company's security log book.
3. Entering restricted office spaces.
4. Mishandling a TWA CARE call.
5. The grievant's failure to respond
to reported burglar alarms at the
home of Lance Carter, Vice President of ground operations.
It is the Company's contention that the foregoing are
specific examples of the grievant's "inadequate performance;"
that efforts to correct the grievant's performance were unavailing
despite "verbal reprimands;" and that the Company finally concluded that because there had been "no improvement," dismissal
was justified.
From this initial argument
least at the

it is clear to me that at

outset of the hearing, the theory of the Company's

case was that the grievant's enumerated offenses constituted
cumulatively and in the aggregate, cause for dismissal.
words, even if none of the listed charges

In other

warranted summary

dismissal, the total record of repeated offenses or infractions,
added up to dischargeable grounds.
On this theory, the Company cannot prevail.

Universally

well settled and well recognized is the rule that to impose the
ultimate penalty of discharge for a series of offenses, none of
which standing alone is grounds for dismissal, requires the preliminary application of progressive discipline - a formal warning
(verbal, or preferably written) followed by a disciplinary suspension, and followed thereafter for a further offense(s), by
discharge.

The warnings and suspension must include the requisite

-3admonition that the employee's conduct or work performance is
unsatisfactory or improper with the additional admonition that
further offenses will
cluding discharge.
known.

result in more severe discipline, in-

The reason for this rule is equally well

It is twofold.

To attempt to rehabilitate the offending

employee, and to put him on explicit notice, by formal statements
and by loss of work time and pay (from a suspension) that the
employer is dissatisfied with his services or conduct, and that
he risks losing his job if he does not improve.
No such progressive discipline was followed here.

Des-

pite the Company's claim that the grievant was warned, the record
does not support a conclusion that he was warned adequately within the meaning and traditional application of progressive discipline.

The foregoing enumerated charges are in chronological

order.

At no time, after each or any of them was the grievant

warned, verbally or in writing that a more severe discipline would
be imposed and/or that his job was in jeopardy if he committed
more offenses or errors.

Indeed, no written warning of any kind

was given to the grievant after and for any of the enumerated
charges.

What verbal remonstrations

there were, if any, did not

carry with them the requisite threat of further and more severe
discipline if improvement was not forthcoming.
the grievant was not suspended.

And of course,

For the reasons stated, the

grievant was entitled to the notice and rehabilitative purposes
of the lesser disciplinary penalties, before being subjected to
discharge.

Accordingly, on the theory of an aggregate, cumula-

tive record, the Company did not have just cause to discharge the

-4-

grievant because of its failure to follow and apply the mandated
procedure of progressive discipline.
However, in the course of the hearings, the Company
asserted an alternative theory, namely that each and any of the
enumerated charges, standing alone, constituted grounds for the
grievant's dismissal.
As parties to arbitrations are not bound to "common law"
pleadings, I will not rule out consideration of this latter
theory, even though it appears to me to be different than the
Company's original position, and apparently designed to "cure"
its failure to utilize progressive discipline or to show that
progressive discipline was not required.
On this latter theory there is obviously no need to
determine whether each of the first four charges would, standing
separately, (or even together) constitute cause for dismissal.
The determinative fact is that the Company did not discharge the
grievant after the occurrence of the first, or the second, or the
third, or the fourth alleged offense.

That it did not means to

me, and I so conclude, that the Company itself did not think that
each of them or any of them in combination added up to cause for
summary dismissal.

Also, as a matter of law, that the Company

did not discharge the grievant then may be construed as a waiver
of any right to do so now. I find that the waiver doctrine is
applicable, the merits of the first four charges .notwithstanding.
Therefore the Company is barred

at this later date, in this pro-

ceeding, from relying on that argument, as it relates to the first
four charges.
1. See pages 11 and 12

-5On this second theory therefore, the propriety of the
grievant's discharge is narrowed to and turns on the fifth charge,
which chronologically is the last in the series.

The question is

simple, whether he committed the fifth offense and if so, whether,
standing on its own, it constitutes just cause for his discharge.
I agree with the Company that a prompt and vigilant response to a burglar alarm at the Company's facilities or at any
location that is part of the alarm system, is a principal and
essential part of the job of a security officer.
However, there is evidence that suggests the possibility
that even as to this fifth charge, the Company did not deem it a
dischargeable offense, with the suspicion that the grievant's
discharge was for a reason unrelated to that charge.
It is alleged by the Company that the grievant failed to
respond to alarms that came in from the Carter home on October
24 and November 5, 1990.
until November 29th, 1990.

Yet the grievant was not discharged
The Company explains that the time

lapse between November 5 and November 29 was due to the need to
get higher level approval for the grievant's discharge.
Monitoring and acting on burglar alarms goes to the heart
of the responsibilities of a security officer.

It seems to me

that if deemed a dischargeable offense for that reason , the
Company could have and should have decided on and imposed the
penalty of discharge more quickly.

Certainly if discharge re-

quired approval of higher officials, and even if they or some were
unavailable, the Company could have suspended the grievant, awaiting final approval of the discharge.

Indeed, charged as he is

-6with what the Company considers a most serious offense - missing
two burglar alarms - I fail to see why the grievant was permitted
to continue at work, performing all his duties, including the
monitoring of the alarm system, another twenty-four days, before
being terminated.
The suspicion of a different reason for his discharge
relates to the date of November 29th, when he was discharged.

It

was the day after the grievant filed a grievance protesting the
Company's failure or refusal to consider and appoint him to a
posted promotional opportunity,

the Managership of Security.

There is evidence in the record of an angry reaction by VicePresident for Security Hubbard to the grievant's earlier request
to be considered for the job and the grievant's announced plan
to grieve.
But there is not enough hard evidence in the record to
raise suspicions

and speculation to the level of proof.

Accord-

ingly, an assessment of the fifth charge, the failure to respond
to two burglar alarms, must be made.
I impute some fault to the grievant on the October 24th
alarm, and find him more at fault with regard to the November 5th
alarm.

He did not log any response by him to either alarm.

concedes that logging the response is required.

He

He claims that

on October 24th, shortly after the alarm came in, and before he
could take steps to respond, Carter's son called in from the
Carter home, and said that the alarm had been tripped by mistake,
but "that everything was Ok."
the Company.

That explanation is challenged by

Carter testified that he did not call Security and

-7and further testified that his son
in either.

told him that he didn't call

Also, the Company introduced into evidence Carter's

home telephone bills for the period, showing no calls to Security.
In the face of the Company's burden to prove the charge by clear
and convincing evidence, the fact that Carter's son did not
I

testify himself (and what his father said he told him is "hearsay"!)
i

and the additional fact that the Carter home had a second telephone with a different number, the bills for which were not produced, leave some reasonable possibility that the grievant's story
is what happened.

Put another way, with those two imponderables,

the Company's evidence falls short of the "clear and convincing"
standard required.

The undenied Company testimony that the griev-

ant said "I blew it" when questioned about the October 24th alarm,
may have been an admission that he was liable for more than his
failure to follow-up the call he says he got from the Carter son
and his failure to log that event or simply limited to those two
omissions.

So that statement is ambiguous and hence inconclusive.

But I find no excuse for the grievant's failure to log what he
said was a call from the son; and no excuse for his failure to
call the Carter home nonetheless, to verify that it was a false
alarm and that the son was in fact there.
The grievant's explanation for missing and not:. responding
to the November 5th alarm from the Carter house, is not acceptable
He states that he has no recollection of that alarm.

He explains

that while the alarm came in and was recorded during his shift,
he may have been away from the security desk at the time,
possibly for personal relief, and that a part-time security

-8officer, Peter Milano filled in for him at those times.

In re-

sponse, the Company introduced unrefuted documentary evidence
that at the time the alarm came in, and for some time before and
after, Milano was out of the building, assigned to direct automobile traffic in and out of the Company's facilities.

I conclude

that it was the grievant's responsibility to notice the alarm of
November 5th, and to respond to it in the prescribed manner.
That he did not, and has no credible explanation, warrants
discipline.
What discipline is proper and appropriate? This is the
first time the grievant failed to respond to an alarm, though he
is a relatively short term employee.

I do not think it fair to

say or conclude that security officers are "absolute guarantors"
of a proper response to every alarm, and face discharge for the
first mistake.

In short, as the matter of remedy and the measure

of discipline is within my authority, as set forth in the stipulated issue, I think that the penalty of discharge, for the first
unquestionable error in monitoring and responding to a burglar
alarm, is too harsh.

It is not at that point, under that circum-

stance, a summary discharge offense.

But that does not mean that

the grievent or anyone in similar circumstances is immune from
penalty.
As I have held that the grievant was unquestionably in
error for the first time with regard to the November 5th alarm,
discipline is appropriate, but less than discharge.
Also well settled in industrial and personnel relations
is the rule that discipline must be applied equally to employees

-9similary situated.

In the instant case I am not persuaded that

the grievant should be punished any more severely than was
security officer Mahoney who, previously, received a five day
suspension

for failure to respond to an alarm.

argues that the facts are dissimilar.

The Company

It asserts that when

Mahoney realized he missed the alarm, he alerted those affected
and concerned, and readily took the blame and responsibility.
But that the grievant did not act on his own initiative to correct
his mistake and engaged in a "cover-up" of his failures.
evidence does not support such a dramatic difference.

The

Unless

the grievant's version of the October 24th incident is rejected,
(and I did not, based on the unclear evidence) it cannot be said
that he failed to alert those affected, but only failed to log
the end result.

As to the November 5th incident, it is his claim

that he never saw or learned of the alarm.
should have noticed the alarm.

I have held that he

That he should have responded;

and that he has no acceptable excuse for not doing both.

But I

have not held and there is not sufficient probative evidence to
prove that he knew of the alarm, willfully ignored it, and covered
up that knowledge.

In short, I have found him negligent, but not

duplicitous.
And if there are distinctions between the Mahoney
situation and that of the grievant, I am not persuaded that they
are so different or dramatic as to justify such a wide distinction

-lO-

in penalty - a five day suspension for the former and discharge
for the latter.

A five day suspension is the proper and prece-

dential disciplinary penalty for the grievant.

October 3, 1991

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

-111.

Though for that reason I need not deal with the
merits of these four charges, I choose to make some
comments so that the record is complete.
I conclude that none of the first four charges,
separately, warranted dismissal.
As to the package which arrived on a Saturday,
and was not delivered to Mr. Icahn's office until
4 PM on Monday, the evidence does not conclusively
show where it was located after arrival and whether
the grievant knew of it or could or should have seen
it on Monday when he was on duty. The principal
complaining witness, Security Manager McAleer
acknowledged that he was at work that Monday with
the grievant, and that he (McAleer) didn't see or
know of the package either. That being so, the
Company has not shown clearly and convincingly,
that the grievant was in any way negligent. And
therefore certainly has not shown this to be a
summary dismissal offense.
The evidence adduced by the Company did not show
that the grievant "falsified" the sign in-sign out
security log when he took his lunch break. The most
that was shown was that the grievant extended his
lunch break beyond the time allowed, but that he
accurately recorded the time he left and the time
he returned, though the period of time between was
in excess of the allowable amount. It was the
grievant, in his own testimony who freely admitted
that at times, as he left for lunch, he recorded
that time five minutes later. He explained that
he did so to cover time to wash up and for business
interruptions as he was on his way to lunch. Important is the undisputed fact that when supervision
told him "not to do that," he stopped doing it forthwith and never did it again. The maximum penalty
for this situation, in my view, would have been a
warning and pay loss for the amount of any extension
of the prescribed lunch period. Manifestly, it is
not a dischargeable offense.
The charge that the grievant "entered a restricted
office space" took a differing form during the hearing. At first the Company asserted that the grievant was seen in the office of Don L. Hubbard, the
Vice President for Security, looking at papers on
Hubbard 1 s desk. Upon the testimony of the witness
who said she saw the grievant in the lighted office

-12at night from her location outside as she
walked from the building to her car, and with
a physical, repeat demonstration at the hearing of how and where she walked and which
window she observed, it turned out undisputedly, that she saw a person stie thought to
be the grievant, not in Hubbard's office, but
in the secretary's office, next to but totally
separated from Hubbard's office. The testimony
did not adequately show what papers, if any,
the grievant was looking at, and indeed, I am
not persuaded, by the clear and convincing
standard required in disciplinary cases, that
the grievant was adequately identified as the
person seen in the office. Finally, it is undisputed that security officers can and do
enter that location to retrieve telephone call
slips and other documents at the request of
superiors. On an evidentiary basis, this event
does not add up to an improper act by the grievant justifying discharge..
In his testimony, the grievant conceded that
he may have exercised some poor judgment in
handling the confidential TWA CARE call. He
admits that he may have been too cavalier when
in response to the complainant's disclosure that
certain employees were "drinking beer at lunch,"
he indicated that beer drinking at lunch was
common. He also admitted that his omission from
the written report of the caller's disclosure
that the Director of that location joined his
employees in beer drinking, was an error. However the Company charge that he breached confidentiality by disclosing the name of the informer, subjecting her to later harassment, was
not proved. The Board listened to the entire
tape of the call, and at no point was the identity of the caller disclosed. Nor was it disclosed
on thegrievant's report. Rather, the grievant did
file a report on the information, and, complying
with his duties and with his assurance to the informant that he would do so. Significant to my
mind, is the grievant's unrefuted testimony that
he received no prior training in the handling of
CARE calls and consequently thought that his casual
and colloquial conversation with the caller, was
appropriate. In any event, if any discipline
would have been appropriate here, in addition to
"re-instruction," a warning would have sufficed.
Summary dismissal could not be sustained.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR MOTION PICTURE
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
- Between LOCAL 702, I.A.T.S.E.

AWARD

and
TVC and PRECISION LABORATORIES

The

Undersigned,

Permanent

Arbitrator

under

the

collective bargaining agreement between the above-named parties,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties,
makes the following AWARD:
To the affected eligible employees on a
schedule that has been agreed to by the
parties and is in the possession of the
parties, TVC and Precision Laboratories owes:
A second week of short time notice pay
in the amount of

$10,179.20

Sick leave pay in the amount of

$ 4,526.33

Annuities for the fourth quarter of 1990
in the amount of

$14,335.25

and
Severance pay to the Estate of Richard
Sweeney in the amount of

$

405.36

Said Laboratories are directed to pay said amounts to
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E. for the benefit of the listed

employees.

Remaining in dispute for a later Award, and over which I
retain jurisdiction,

are the amounts owed by TVC and Precision

Laboratories for:
The first week of the short time notice pay.
Bonuses.
Vacation pay.
Annuities for the
quarter of 1990.

first,

second

and third

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED:

November 25, 1991

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR MOTION PICTURE
FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
- Between OPINION AND AWARD

LOCAL 702, I.A.T.S.E.
and

TVC and PRECISION LABORATORIES

X

The stipulated issues are:
1.

Did the Employer (TVC) violate the contract by
failing to promote JOHN SALVATORE to the position
of Shipping Foreman?
If so, what shall be the
remedy?

2.

Did the Employer (TVC) violate the contract by
laying off JAMES GARRETT? If so, what shall be the
remedy?

3.

Did the Employer (TVC) violate the contract by
failing to pay an annuity to STEPHEN PERTAKAKIS?
If so, what shall be the remedy?

4.

Did the Employer (TVC) violate the contract by
failing to make proper employee medical benefit
contribution? If so, what shall be the remedy?

5.

Did the Employer (TVC) violate the contract by
failing to make contributions to the Defined
Contribution Pension Plan?
If so, what shall be
the remedy?

6.

Did the Employer (Precision) violate the contract
by failing to pay severance, vacations, sick pay,
short time notice pay and annuity payments? If so,
what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held at the offices of Local 702 on August
26, 1991 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and
Employer(s) appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
The arbitrators oath was waived.

ISSUE NO. 1
Pertinent to this issue is Section 13, Paragraph (d) of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement which reads:
If a classification of work has been manned by
an

employee

or

employees

from

a

lower

classification for three days or more per week
for a period of thirteen consecutive weeks,
the Employer agrees to make a promotion to the
higher

classification

in

accordance

with

Section 14, except in cases of temporary
transfers

made

for

employee

absent

the
or

replacement

any

of

an _

reason

emergencies.
It is the Union's contention that from June 1, 1990 until
December 10, 1990, the grievant, JOHN SALVATORE worked as a Foreman
of Shipping in the Shipping Department; that because this period
exceeded the amount of time referred to in the aforesaid contract
provision, he should have been promoted to the Foreman position
effective
adjustment.

December
The

10,
Union

1990
seeks

with

an

upward

an order

from

retroactive
this

pay

arbitrator

directing the Company to promote SALVATORE to that position; to
assign him to it in the Shipping Department; and to make him whole
in pay retroactive to December 10, 1990.

The Company does not deny that the grievant performed the
Foreman of Shipping job duties during the period from June 1 to
December 10, 1990.

Nor does it dispute the claim that the work

over that period of time was performed on a regular basis, thereby
satisfying the contractual time requisite of "three days or more
per week

for a period

of thirteen

consecutive

weeks."

The

Employer's defense is that the grievant was filling in for the
regular

Foreman

who

was

absent

due

to

illness;

that

the

circumstances fell within the contractual exception of Section
13 (d) of the contract; and that therefore the grievant is not
eligible for the promotion.
The

question

is narrowed

to whether

the

grievant's

assignment to the Foreman duties and responsibilities was as a
"replacement for an employee absent for any reason" or whether
actually or constructively the assignment was of an unconditional
nature

for

which

an

official

promotion

to

the

Foreman

classification was justified and contractually mandated.
The evidence shows that prior to June 1, 1990, the
grievant also worked as the Foreman in the Shipping Department
covering for the Department's foreman, MIKE MCNAMARA who was absent
due to illness.

He worked in that capacity from the middle of

August in 1977 until the middle of November 1987.

In January,

1988, he was assigned to the Shipping Department to cover for
another employee, classified as a Shipper. But from that date and

for the next couple of years until June 1, 1990, he also covered
for MCNAMARA on several occasions and for various periods of time
when MCNAMARA was absent due to illness.

It is undisputed that

each time he was assigned to cover for MCNAMARA, the grievant was
paid the Foreman's rate of pay.
At the end of May, 1990, or commencing June 1, 1990,
MCNAMARA, who was suffering from cancer, was placed on permanent
disability.

Thereafter, he did not return to work.

The legal

guestion posed by the facts, is simply, whether from June 1 on
MCNAMARA was still "absent" within the meaning of Section 13(d) of
the contract.

If so, the grievant was not entitled to calculate

the period from June 1, 1990 as time worked within the Foreman
classification for purposes of a promotion.

On the other hand, if

MCNAMARA was no longer "absent" within the meaning of Section
13(d), the grievant was no longer replacing an absent employee, but
rather, constructively, if not legally, was occupying the job in
his own right.
In my view, and as a matter of law, an employee who is
"permanently disabled" and who leaves his job for that reason, is
no longer "absent."

The status of being "absent" implies and

carries with it the possibility and right to return to the job at
a later date, especially if the absent is due to illness. However,
when deemed "permanently disabled" and when a job is vacated for
that reason, there is no longer a possibility of a return to the

job at a later date (nor a legal right to do so) and the position
has become contractually vacated.

In my judgement that is what

happened here.
Accordingly, although the grievant replaced McNamara who
was absent due to illness for several periods of time prior to June
1, 1990, from that latter date until December 10, 1990 when for
reasons unrelated to this case, the grievant was returned to a job
in the vault, the grievant worked as the Foreman of the Shipping
Department not as a replacement for an employee absent but as the
unconditional Foreman, albeit defacto.
Section

13(d)

he

is

entitled

to

Under the provisions of

promotion

to

that

higher

classification, dejure.
The

Employer

asks

that

if SALVATORE's grievance is

granted, any back pay award have offset from it a $60 a week wage
increase

which

he

has

received

since

apparently began "supervisor training."

July

of

1987

when

he

The record does not show

any connection between that $60 a week premium and his work in the
Shipping Department.

The fact is that when he worked as the

Shipping Department Foreman (as a replacement for McNamara and
after June 1, 1990) he received the Foreman's rate (which is the
rate for the classification plus ten

(10%) percent)

and also

continued to enjoy the additional $60 which he states the Employer
"let him keep."

Clearly, therefore, the $60 was compensation

related to some other activity; had its origins in some other and
earlier type of supervisory training, and the Employer gratuitously

allowed him to retain it when he filled in for or became the
Shipping Department Foreman:

That being so, I think it would be

inequitable and even in the nature of a penalty to order that the
$60 "bonus" now be deducted from the back pay award, especially
when the record is unclear in its origin and the consideration for
it.

That the Employer allowed him to keep it during the extended

period that he was performing the Foreman's duties persuades me
that he would have retained it and therefore is entitled to retain
it from the time that he is officially classified as the Foreman,
whether originally promoted by the Employer voluntarily, or as now,
promoted by this arbitration decision.
ISSUE NO. 2
The grievant, JAMES GARRETT, was a Raw Stock Splicer. He
was the only one so classified in the bargaining unit.
the shift from 8:00 A.M. to 4:00 P.M.

He worked

He began work on June 3,

1990 and was laid off May 3, 1991.
At the arbitration hearing, the Company explained that
the grievant was laid off because of a diminution of work within
the Raw Stock Splicer classification and also because his work
performance was not satisfactory.
Let me deal with the latter reason first.

At no time

prior to the arbitration hearing did the Employer tell the grievant
or the Union that the grievant's work was not satisfactory or in
any way deficient.
grievance

procedure.

It was not an Employer defense during the
Asserted

for

the

first

time

at

the

arbitration hearing, the Employer offered no probative evidence in
support of the charge.

I conclude therefore that not only is that

particular charge unproved, but that it was not a basis for the
grievant's layoff.
The Employer's contention that the available work to be
assigned to the Raw Stock Splicer had diminished to the point where
his

further

active

employment was unnecessary,

supported by the evidence.

is simply

not

The testimony and evidence adduced by

the Union, which stands basically unrefuted by the Employer is that
supervisory

employees

and

bargaining

unit

employees

from

the

Printing Department are now performing duties within the Raw Stock
Splicer classification which the grievant performed before his
layoff.

Specifically,

picking

up

film

ordered

from

outside

sources, logging of inventories and the distribution of stock to
the Printers are being performed by the Printers themselves, by a
supervisor

(HOLY),

by

a non-bargaining unit

courier

(ANTHONY

MUSCADO) and by a bargaining unit can carrier (J. ORTIZ).
As I stated, the Employer has not refuted this evidence
and testimony.

Indeed, the Employer representatives admit that

"the work is getting done" and that "someone is doing it."

They

were not able to identify who has been doing the work since the
grievant's layoff, but with the acknowledgement that the work
continues

to be performed, I must

conclude that

it is being

performed by persons not in the Raw Stock Splicer classification.
Hence, I do not find any diminution of work which would justify the
grievant's layoff.

That the available Raw Stock Splicer work may be on a
different shift than the shift the grievant worked, is immaterial.
Obviously, as the work belonged in his classification, the grievant
was entitled to and should have been given the opportunity to
transfer to the shift on which the work was available and where he
could continue to perform it.
ISSUE NO. 3
PERTAKAKIS claims an annuity of $750 representing the
$1.00 an hour contributed by the Employer to the Annuity Plan for
the 750 hours he worked before his termination.
The Employer contends that no employee is eligible for
any annuity until he has completed at least 1,000 hours of service.
Article

V

of

the

contract

which

provides

for

the

Employer's contributions to the Plan defines a "year of service" as
"at least

1,000 hours of service."

It also provides for an

Employer contribution to the Plan or Trust of "an amount equal to
$1.00 for each hour of service performed during said Plan year."
However, Article V does not make any reference to a
threshold minimum amount of service before an annuity is to be
paid. At best, the language of Article V is ambiguous and does not
support the Employers interpretation with the clarity required to
resolve the ambiguity in the Employer's favor.
It is obvious that the parties recognized that ambiguity
by clarifying it at a meeting on March 12, 1987 of the Trustees of
the Plan.

Indeed, the minutes of that meeting, participated in by

Employer and Union Trustees is dispositive of the issue in dispute
in this

arbitration,

and

supported

by a practice

subsequent

thereto.

Both affirm the Union's case in this arbitration.
As the minutes were transmitted to the Trustees and to

counsel for the Trustees by the Employer, I conclude that the
minutes also were recorded by the Employer.

Section 1 of the

minutes is entitled:
How do we treat temporary employees vis-a-vis
contributions?
The pertinent part of that Section reads as follows "...:
No employee goes into the Plan until he or she
has reached 1,000 hours.

Monies will be put

aside for them and will be paid to them if
they

leave

before

having

reached

1,000

hours..." (Emphasis added)
There is no evidence that the minutes lack authenticity,
and there is no evidence that the Trustees had not reached that
agreement.

Significantly, the last paragraph of Section 1 reads:
"All Trustees
this

question.

agree with the resolution of
The Plan will be changed

accordingly."
Additionally, the Union has introduced unrefuted evidence
of seven instances over the period from March 26, 1987 to March 3,

1989 in which the Employer granted monies to departing employees
equivalent to the Employer contributions on their behalf to the
Plan for periods of employment less than 1,000 hours.
Accordingly, based on the explicit minutes agreed to by
the Trustees and supported by an unvaried practice

thereafter,

PERTAKAKIS is entitled to the $750 he claims.
ISSUE NO. 4
This issue is not disputed.

When the Employer changed

its medical plan coverage from U.S. Health Care (Blue Cross/Blue
Shield) to the Travelers Insurance Company four present employees
and two former employees were left uncovered.

(The latter two had

been covered by COBRA).
In the course of the hearing, the Employer conceded that
all

six

should

insurance.

have

been

and

should

be

covered

by

medical

The Employer represented that shortly after Labor Day

all six will be covered and that if any of them had incurred
insured

medical expenses

during the period that they were not

covered, the Employer would reimburse them for those expenses.
My Award shall reflect that foregoing acknowledgement and
representation.

The six employees should have been and shall be

covered retroactive to the date that they lost coverage and shall
be reimbursed for any medical costs incurred during the interim
period, if such costs would have been covered by the medical plan.
ISSUE NO. 5
This

issue

is

also

not

disputed.

The

Employer

acknowledges that it has not made contributions to the Defined
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Contribution Pension Plan since September 30, 1990 and admits that
he was and is obligated to make those contributions.
Accordingly, my Award shall direct the Employer to make
payments to the Defined Contribution Pension Plan for the Fourth
Quarter of 1990 and for the First and Second Quarters of 1991, up
to and including June 30, 1991.
ISSUE NO. 6
This issue has not yet been heard.

A hearing on it has

been duly scheduled for Monday, September 30, 1991.
•

The

Undersigned,

•

•

Permanent

Arbitrator

under

the

Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above-named parties and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes
the following Award:
1.

The Employer (TVC) violated the contract by failing
to

promote

JOHN

SALVATORE

Shipping Foreman.
position

and

made

to

the

position

of

He shall be promoted to that
whole

for

wages

lost

from

December 10, 1990.
2.

The Employer (TVC) violated the contract by laying
off JAMES GARRETT.

GARRETT shall be reinstated to

the position of Raw Stock Splicer and made whole
for wages lost from the period of his layoff to the
date of his reinstatement.
3.

The Employer (TVC) violated the contract by failing
to pay

an annuity

to STEPHEN PERTAKAKIS.

Employer shall pay PERTAKAKIS the sum of $750.
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The

4.

The Employer (TVC) violated the contract by failing
to

make

proper

contributions

on

employee
behalf

of

medical

benefit

employees

ERNEST

DECOTIIS, GEORGE DUTTENHOFER, ANGEL GUERRERO AND
CATHLEEN SALVATORE and former employees RASSO and
MILAZZO.

The Employer is directed to provide the

contractually

required

medical

coverage

and

insurance for those six persons retroactive to the
date that their coverage ended and to reimburse any
of

said

employees

for

medical

expenses

they

incurred during the interim period, provided such
expenses were or would have been covered by the
required insurance or policy.
5.

The Employer (TVC) violated the contract by failing
to make contributions to the Defined Contribution
Pension Plan.

The Employer is directed to make the

following quarterly payments:
For the Fourth Quarter 1990

$16,826.50

For the First Quarter 1991

$35,055.25

For the Second Quarter 1991, ending
June 30, 1991

$32,980.25

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED:

September

, 1991

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
International Union, Local 8-891

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
and

and
AWARD
Union Carbide Corporation
OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Our Award of June 6, 1989 found that there was not proper
cause for the discharge of Milton Sadofski. We ordered his reinstatement but denied him back pay because of his failure to
mitigate the damages. Thereafter the parties found themselves
in dispute over whether for the period of his discharge Sadofski
was or was not entitled to vacation pay or time, holiday pay,
Company paid medical coverage and participation in a "profit
sharing" arrangement negotiated as a substitute for a portion of
a wage increase.
A hearing on these dispute was held on January 18, 1990 at
the Company offices in Bound Brook, New Jersey at which time,
Mr. Sadofski, hereinafter referred to as the grievant, and representatives of the above-named Company and Union appeared- All
concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Oath
of the Arbitrators was waived, and the parties filed post-hearing
briefs.
With the reinstatement of the authority of the Board of
Arbitration by joint agreement of the parties to hear and decide
the aforesaid disputes, Mr. Patrick O'Connor served as the Union
arbitrator, Mr. John T. Hock as the Company arbitrator, and the
Undersigned as chairman.
March 14, 1990.

The Board met in executive session on

-2Under traditional circumstances, with the finding that there
was not just cause for his discharge, and that the charge against
him was not proved by the requisite quantum of proof, the grievant would have been reinstated "with full back pay and benefits,"
less his earnings elsewhere, if any, had he mitigated damages or
i

tried to mitigate damages.

The "earnings elsewhere" would have be$n

an offset against back wages only and would not have affected his
other contractual benefits, such as holidays, vacation and medical coverage.
Therefore, the deprivation of back pay because of a failure
to mitigate would not and was not intended to affect benefits,
other than direct wages.
The nature of the grievant's status as a result of our Award
is determinative. He was not found to have committed the offense
charged and for which he was discharged, nor was he found culpable of any lesser offense which would have justified a disciplinary penalty.

Indeed, the Award meant that he should not have been

discharged or otherwise disciplined at all. So the denial of back
pay was not because he committed some offense for which discharge
was too severe, nor for which a lesser disciplinary penalty, such
as a suspension would be proper.
In short, the denial of back pay was not disciplinary but
rather the application of legal principle of the duty to mitigate
or to try to mitigate damages.
It follows then that the intent of the original Award was
the loss of direct wages, not other benefits even if they are
economic in nature. There is compelling logic to this delineation
Had he worked at another job, only the wages therefrom would have
been used as an offset against back pay. But any vacation pay or
time, holiday pay, or even medical coverage he enjoyed at that
other employment would not have been used to offset the holidays,
vacations and medical insurance he would have received from the
Company had he not been discharged.

So the effect of mitigation

-3or the lack thereof applies to direct wages during the period involved, not beyond, and that was our intent.
Furthermore, had we intended to deprive him of benefits, we
would have ordered his reinstatement "without back pay and benefits."
pay."

We did not do so.

We ordered reinstatement "without back

Had he committed some disciplinary offense short of justi-

fying discharge, we might have reinstated him "without back pay
and benefits," as the penalty for that offense. But absent culpability for a job related offense or misconduct, the application
of the law of mitigation is and was intended to reach only direct
wages .
Therefore, we shall award him the vacation time and holiday
pay he claims. However, we shall award him only the amount of
medieval insurance he should have paid had he converted his policy.
/
d However, we shall deny his claim to the "profit sharing" bonu
because we deem that that was direct wages (albeit in a unique
form). During the period of his discharge, a percentage wage increase was negotiated. Instead of it being applied to the wage
rates it or a portion was paid to the employees in a lump sum
bonus, again by negotiated agreement. That bonus, characterized
as "profit sharing" is obviously wages in a different form.

Had

the full percentage wage increase been implemented (without any
bonus arrangement) the grievant would not have received any of it
under our Award during the period of his discharge. He would have
resumed employment at the new wage rate, without any retroactive
adjustment. So, like a wage increase during the period he was
out, he was not entitled to the lump sum payout, and must resume
employment at whatever rate of pay obtained at that point, even
if, as apparently is the case, that net rate is less because it
or a portion of a greater (theoretical) percentage was paid in a
lump sum bonus. I am not prepared to find that the bonus was all
or in part for "prospective wages" accruing on and after the date
of the grievant's reinstatement.

Rather, because it was negotiatel

-4-

that way, and paid during the period of the grievant's absence
and because there is no express evidence that it was intended as a'i
early part payment of future wages, I cannot find that the grievant is entitled to it, or that it is an exception to or an exemption from our denial of back pay.
AWARD
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of Arbitration,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the abovenamed parties, make the following AWARD:
1.

Milton Sadofski shall be entitled
to five (5) weeks of vacation for
future use.

2.

Milton Sadofski shall be paid
$1995.36 for medical insurance
coverage.

3.

Milton Sadofski shall be paid for
twenty two (22) holidays.

4.

Milton Sadofski's claim for a
profit sharing bonus distributed
in February 1989 is denied. With
regard to profit sharing distribution for 1990, Sadofski is entitled to participate therein for
and/or related to the period from
his reinstatement forward.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: March 27, 1990
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

-5-

John T. Hock
Concurring in 1, 2, 3. 4
Dissenting from 1,2,3,4
DATED: March
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1990

I, John T. Hock do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

Patrick O'Connor
Concurring in 1, 2, 3, 4
Dissenting from 1,2,3,4
DATED: March
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1990

I, Patrick O'Connor do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local No. 1
Elevator Constructors
and

A W A R D
on
Arbitrability
Case #13 300 01006 89

Westinghouse Elevator Company &
Elevator Manufacturers Association
of New York
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the abovenamed parties, makes the following AWARD.
The issues submitted to me are numbered 2 and 3 in the
Union's Demand for Arbitration, dated August 22, 1989.
Those issues read:
2. The Union grieves the layoff by Westinghouse
Elevator Company of permanent mechanics, allegedly to make room for those helpers who
passed the mechanic's test.
3. The Union grieves the layoff by Armor
Elevator Company of permanent mechanics,
allegedly to make room for helpers who
passed the mechanic's test.
Within those issues, the grievances that are arbitrable
are those of or on behalf of:
Gerard Lombardo
Arnold Graham
Thomas Vance
Brian Moran
Kevin Shields
George Urrettia
Raymond Walsh
The Union's letter of August 1, 1989 (Union Exhibit #1)
has not been shown to be sufficiently probative to have timely
placed other grievances within the two issues before me.

-2Also and therefore those additional grievances were not
"other pending grievances" within the meaning of Section VIII
Para. 2 of the contract at the time of the August 17th meeting
of the New York Arbitration Committee. Even if those "other"
grievances were raised or discussed at that meeting they were
not, at that point "pending grievances" (emphasis added) which
were eligible to be raised.
The language "Neither party shall be limited by such submission" applies to "other pending grievances" and permits
those grievances to be considered regardless of the original
submission of grievances to the Committee. But as the other
grievances which the Union claims are arbitrable within issues
2 and 3 were not yet "pending" grievances at that time, they
do not qualify as exceptions to the limitation of the submission.
This AWARD makes no determination on the arbitrability of
other grievances before other arbitrators or within the other
issues set forth in the Union's Demand for Arbitration.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 23, 1990
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

